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THE CASE FOR INVESTOR ORDERING
Scott Hirst*
Whether corporate arrangements should be mandated by public law or “privately
ordered” by corporations themselves has been a foundational question in corporate law
scholarship. State corporation laws are generally privately ordered. But a significant and
growing number of arrangements are governed by “corporate regulations” created by the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). SEC corporate regulations are
invariably mandatory. Whether they should be is the focus of this Article.
This Article contributes to the ongoing debate by showing that whether mandatory or
privately-ordered rules are optimal depends on the nature of investors, and their
incentives in choosing corporate arrangements. The rise of institutional investors means
that investors can now be relied on to choose optimal arrangements, because institutional
investors will make informed decisions about corporate arrangements and will internalize
their effects on the capital markets.
This Article thus makes the case for a third alternative: “investor ordering.” For all
but a few corporate regulations, investor ordering will result in the same or greater
aggregate net benefit as mandatory regulations.
The optimality of investor ordering of SEC corporate regulations has important
implications. First, the D.C. Circuit’s jurisprudence on cost-benefit analysis will require
the SEC to consider investor ordering. In the many cases where investor ordering would
be superior to mandatory regulation, were the SEC to nevertheless implement a
mandatory regulation, it would be susceptible to invalidation by the D.C. Circuit under
the Administrative Procedure Act.
Second, investor ordering substantially reduces the burden of the D.C. Circuit’s
recent requirements for SEC cost-benefit analysis. This reduces the overall cost of SEC
rule making, or permits the SEC to promulgate more regulations on its fixed budget. It
also sidesteps the considerable academic debate about the value of cost-benefit analysis for
corporate regulations.
Third, investor ordering reduces the need for retrospective analysis. To the extent
retrospective analysis remains necessary, investor ordering makes it more straightforward
and also permits lower-cost regulatory experimentation. Investor ordering therefore allows
for a more dynamic regulatory system.
These benefits mean that the SEC should implement investor ordering as its default
approach for new regulation and for deregulation. This Article considers a number of
promising candidates for investor ordering among potential and proposed SEC
regulations, and for deregulation of contentious existing SEC regulations. Investor
ordering also has important implications for state corporation laws and for federal
legislation.
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Introduction
Corporate arrangements1 in the United States are governed by two bodies of
law with very different natures. Most corporate arrangements are governed by
state corporation laws,2 which require certain arrangements, but are generally
enabling, permitting corporations to “privately order” their own arrangements.3
However, a substantial and growing body of corporate arrangements are governed
by “corporate regulations” promulgated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).4 Since the creation of the SEC,5 its corporate regulations have
almost invariably been mandatory, either requiring or prohibiting corporate
arrangements that relate to the internal affairs of corporations.6

1

By “corporate arrangements” I refer to the rule governing the internal affairs of the
corporation. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84
Nw. U. L. Rev. 542, 546–47 (1990) (defining corporate law as “laws . . . that primarily govern the
relationship between a company's managers and investors”); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure
of Corporation Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1461, 1462 (1989) (considering legal rules that concern the
internal organization of the corporation and the conduct of corporate actors).
2
See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 (2017); Model Business Corporation Act (Am.
Bar Ass’n. 2016). See infra Part V.D. for discussion of the application of investor ordering to state
corporate law rules.
3
Inclusion or exclusion of such provisions is generally achieved by amending the corporation’s
certificate of incorporation. E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(d) (regarding classified boards of
directors); id. § 102(b)(7) (liability of directors for breach of fiduciary duty). In some cases, it may be
achieved by amending the bylaws of the corporation, e.g., id. § 112 (regarding inclusion of shareholder
nominations in proxy soliciting materials); id. § 113 (regarding proxy expense reimbursement).
4
SEC regulations have long governed the proxy process that underlies shareholder meetings,
the means by which shareholders appoint directors as their agents. See Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012). These rules have expanded to cover the information that public
corporations must provide to their shareholders, which, while couched as disclosure regulations,
drive the substantive choices of managers. See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities
Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 859, 875 (2003)
(describing disclosure requirements as “forcing substance”). Successive legislative reforms have
further expanded corporate regulations to cover additional areas, including offers by the corporation
or others to buy shares from investors, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10A-3–240.10C-1 (2017); the composition
of boards of directors and their committees, id. §§ 240.10A-3–240.10C-1; the internal controls of
corporations, id. §§ 240.13a-15–240.15d-15; the attestation of accounts provided to investors, id. §§
240.13a-14–240.15d-14; investor approval of executive compensation, id. § 240.14a-21 (2017); and
investor nomination of directors, id. § 240.14a-11 (2010), invalidated by Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647
F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) [hereinafter Bus. Roundtable II], to name but a few.
5
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2016).
6
That is, SEC regulations either require certain arrangements among managers and investors in
those corporations, e.g., id. § 78m (requiring periodic reporting), or prohibit such arrangements, e.g.,
id. § 78l (prohibiting the issue of securities); id. § 78m (prohibiting loans to directors and officers);
id. § 78n (prohibiting the solicitation of proxies); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (2017) (prohibiting certain
tender offer practices). On at least one occasion, Congress has created an “opt-in” rule in a corporate
regulation. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c (2012) (permitting emerging
growth companies to forgo certain disclosure exemptions, and thereby opt in to certain SEC
requirements).

2

Why not allow the constituents of corporations to choose their own
arrangements?7 This question has been the subject of foundational debates
regarding mandatory disclosure8 and contractual freedom in corporate law.9
Mandatory corporate arrangements have been justified on the grounds of
externalities—that corporations would not take into account the effects of their
arrangements on others—and agency costs—that managers of corporations may
not choose the arrangements that are best for the corporation.10
This Article makes an observation that has significant implications for this
debate. Both of these justifications for mandatory rules depend on the nature of
investors11 in corporations.12 This observation is important because the nature of
investors in U.S. corporations has changed dramatically since the time the
securities laws were enacted, and even since the justifications for mandatory rules
were put forth.

7

See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic
Structure of Corporate Law (1991); George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities
Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117 (1964).
8
Representative works in the debate on mandatory disclosure include John C. Coffee, Jr., No
Exit: Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the Corporation and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 Brook.
L. Rev. 919 (1988); Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1047 (1995); Stigler, supra note 7; Irwin Friend & Edward S. Herman, The S.E.C.
Through a Glass Darkly, 37 J. Bus. 382 (1964) (responding to Stigler). See also Allen Ferrell, The
Case for Mandatory Disclosure in Securities Regulation around the World, 2 Brook. J. Corp. Fin.
& Com. L. 81 (2007) (summarizing empirical finance contributions to this debate); Christian Leuz
& Peter D. Wysocki, Economic Consequences of Financial Reporting and Disclosure Regulation: A Review
and
Suggestions
for
Future
Research
(2008),
https://papers.ssrn.come/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1105398 (summarizing the debate from the
accounting research perspective).
9
Representative works in the debate on contractual freedom, among many others, include
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 7; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual
Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1395 (1989); Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance,
Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1403 (1985). See also William W.
Bratton, Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual Corporation, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 180 (1992);
Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. Corp. L.
779 (2006) (both giving retrospective accounts of the debate).
10 The agency cost rationale assumes that investors cannot protect themselves from such choices
ex ante. See infra Part I.A.2. A third rationale is economies of scale in setting arrangements. See infra
Part II.C.6. A potential fourth rationale, that mandatory rules would expand the scope of enforcement
options from those available to private parties or reduce the cost of these enforcement options, could
also apply to non-mandatory rules.
11 I will generally use the term “investors” rather than “shareholders” or “stockholders” to
collectively refer to the equity investors in corporations unless further differentiation is necessary.
Shareholders will necessarily be investors, but there are additional equity investors in the firm who
are not technically shareholders, because they invest through intermediaries, including institutional
investors and their own investors. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate
Voting, 96 Geo. L.J. 1227, 1236 (2008) (describing custodial ownership); Scott Hirst, Social
Responsibility Resolutions, 43 J. Corp. L. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 5) (describing the
beneficial ownership of institutional investors).
12 See infra Part I.C.
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Control of corporations was formerly dominated either by insiders—managers
or controlling shareholders who have incentives to choose arrangements that
would maximize their private benefits—or by small investors—who have no
incentive to oversee directors or managers13 to prevent such agency costs.14
Because these investors are undiversified, they also do not have incentives to
consider the effect of corporate arrangements on other corporations or those
corporations’ investors.15
Since that time, the rise of institutional investors has transformed the
ownership of U.S. corporations.16 Institutional investors, such as investment
managers and pension funds, now invest the overwhelming majority of capital in
U.S. corporations and have the capability to determine corporations’ choice of
arrangements.17 Institutional investors have incentives to limit the agency costs of
managers. Because they hold broadly diversified portfolios that include interests in
many corporations, they also have incentives to consider the externalities for those
other corporations.
If the main justifications for mandatory rules no longer apply, how then should
corporate regulations be designed? This Article makes the case for an alternative
approach, “investor ordering.”18 The SEC should set default arrangements for
corporations,19 but permit corporations to switch to alternative arrangements if
their investors approve.20 To ensure that corporations initiate value-enhancing
switches, the SEC should set default arrangements to encourage managers to
initiate switching. Though these prescriptions may seem modest, they would
represent a significant change in the SEC’s approach to rule making. Investor
ordering would also have important implications for investor value, the cost of SEC
regulation, and a more dynamic regulatory system.

13

While directors and executives have different roles in the management of the corporation, in
many cases, this distinction is not significant. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual
Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 Harv. L. Rev.
1820, 1835 (1989). I therefore refer to directors and executives collectively as “managers” unless
differentiation is necessary.
14 See Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and
Private Property 87 (1932).
15 See infra Part I.B.
16 E.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of Institutional
Investors, J. Econ. Persp., Summer 2017, at 89, 91.
17 See infra Part I.C.
18 See infra Part II.A. (further specifying “investor ordering”).
19 Investor ordering will only be possible where a corporation has a body of outside investors, so
it is not appropriate for regulations that apply to offerings before a corporation has such a body of
investors.
20 There are arguments for and against whether switching decisions made prior to initial public
offerings (IPOs) should be approved by public shareholders post-IPO. Given the long-standing and
unresolved debate on this issue, I leave it for the SEC to determine whether such approval should be
required on a case-by-case basis.
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The central claim of this Article is that investor ordering will have the same or
greater aggregate net benefit as mandatory rules.21 Where the default arrangement
has net benefits for corporations that are greater than the costs of switching
arrangements, no corporations will switch, and the aggregate net benefit of investor
ordering will be the same as that of a mandatory rule. However, to the extent that
a default arrangement has greater costs for any corporations than the cost of
switching, those corporations would have greater net benefit with investor
ordering.
This investor value case for investor ordering is dependent on a number of
assumptions; to the extent these do not hold, they are arguments against investor
ordering.22 This Article considers several of these counterarguments, and explains
why they are unlikely to hold. First, investor ordering may be inferior to mandatory
rules if there is insufficient initiation of switching to arrangements investors prefer,
as there is for many state law arrangements.23 However, because state laws use
manager-favorable defaults, switching relies on investors’ ability to initiate
switches, which may be limited.24 Investor ordering would give managers
significant incentives to initiate switches, resolving this concern. Second, investor
ordering may be inferior to mandatory rules if institutional investors do not choose
corporate arrangements that are in the interests of their own investors. While
institutional investors have agency problems of their own,25 these problems are not
likely to cause them to choose arrangements that are not in the interests of their
own investors. Finally, if investor ordering duplicates significant costs for
corporations and investors in choosing arrangements, it may also be inferior to
mandatory rules.26 However, the limited costs involved in investor ordering
decisions mean this is unlikely to be the case.
Two assumptions on which the investor value case is based may limit investor
ordering. First, institutional investors are unlikely to internalize potential
externalities that extend beyond other corporations and capital markets
participants.27 However, this limitation will be narrow, since the nature of the
SEC’s remit means that most SEC regulations will not have such effects. Second,
21

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
23 See Michal Barzuza, The Private Ordering Paradox in Corporate Law, 8 Harv. Bus. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 4), https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2930667; see also Michael
Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 1325, 1349 (2013)
(“the experience of the period from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s does not support the
contractarian expectation that management will initiate agency cost-reducing measures.”).
24 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evolution, 96
Nw. U. L. Rev. 489, 503 (2002) (recognizing “impediments to reversing a default arrangement
favored by management and that such an arrangement thus might not be reversed even if the
arrangement is value decreasing and the transaction costs of changing it are small.”).
25 Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst, supra note 16, at 90.
26 See infra Part II.C.6.
27 See infra Part II.C.4.
22
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where institutional investors do not have a veto over choices of corporate
arrangements at particular corporations, those corporations may choose suboptimal arrangements. In particular, small companies have lower levels of
institutional investment, so institutional investors may not have sufficient equity
to exercise a veto.28 The SEC should consider both of these limitations in designing
regulations, and would be justified in making mandatory rules in the relatively
narrow sets of circumstances where these limitations are likely to apply.
Several propositions follow from the investor value case because of two
features of SEC rule making: the requirement for the SEC to undertake costbenefit analysis and the SEC’s practice of retrospective analysis.
When combined with the SEC’s requirement to undertake cost-benefit
analysis, the investor value case may require the SEC to implement investor
ordering. The SEC is required to undertake cost-benefit analysis29 of its
regulations,30 and of deregulation.31 The D.C. Circuit has interpreted this to
require the SEC to consider reasonable alternatives to a proposed regulation.32
Investor ordering would be an obvious and reasonable alternative for most
mandatory regulations, and would therefore require consideration. In the great
majority of situations, where the above limitations do not apply, investor ordering
will result in greater aggregate net benefits for investors than a mandatory rule. For
the SEC to nevertheless implement a mandatory rule is likely to meet the D.C.
Circuit’s definition of “arbitrary and capricious,”33 making the regulation
susceptible to invalidation for breach of the Administrative Procedure Act.34
The requirement that the SEC undertake cost-benefit analysis of its rule
making is a relatively recent phenomenon. The impact has been to substantially
increase the costs of SEC cost-benefit analysis.35 The merit of this change has been
the subject of contentious debate among legal scholars. Critics argue that costbenefit analysis imposes a substantial and unrealistic burden on rule making, for
little gain, and should be curtailed.36 However, there are no indications that the
requirements for cost-benefit analysis are likely to diminish. On the contrary,

28

See infra Part II.C.2.
Different authors have variously referred to “cost-benefit analysis” and “benefit-cost
analysis.” I use the term “cost-benefit analysis,” as that appears to be the SEC’s preferred term. See,
e.g., Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities and Exchange Commission Release
No. 34-60089, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024, 29,071 (Jun. 18, 2009).
30 See Bus. Roundtable II at 1148.
31 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2012) (defining “rule making” as
including the amendment or repeal of a rule).
32 U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2005) [hereinafter Chamber
of Commerce I].
33 See Bus. Roundtable II at 1149.
34 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
35 See infra Part III.C.1.
36 See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and
Implications, 124 Yale L.J. 882, 888–89 (2015).
29
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recent judicial developments and pending legislation would increase the
requirements for SEC cost-benefit analysis.37
A second significant implication of investor ordering is that it would
significantly reduce the cost of such SEC cost-benefit analysis.38 The most costly
part of cost-benefit analysis is determining the likely costs of a regulation. Investor
ordering makes determining the cost of a regulation much more straightforward
and much less costly. Where an investor ordered arrangement imposes greater cost
on a corporation than the cost of switching to an alternative, the corporation will
switch, and will incur only the cost of switching. Investor ordering effectively
“caps” the cost to corporations of an arrangement at the cost of switching. The
maximum aggregate cost of an investor ordered regulation is therefore the sum of
switching costs for those corporations that would switch arrangements. Because
the process for switching will be the same for different corporations and for
different regulations, switching costs will not vary significantly, and will be
relatively straightforward for the SEC to calculate.
Reducing the cost of cost-benefit analysis would reduce the cost of SEC rule
changes. This would have obvious benefits, irrespective of whether regulation is
considered desirable or undesirable. If regulation is viewed as undesirable, investor
ordering would reduce the cost that SEC rule making imposes on government.
Because deregulatory actions of the SEC are also subject to cost-benefit analysis
requirements, investor ordering would permit greater deregulation at lower cost.
If regulation is viewed as desirable, investor ordering would permit the SEC to
undertake a greater level of rule making on its fixed budget. Either way, investor
ordering reduces the barrier that cost-benefit analysis presents for rule changes. By
reducing the cost of cost-benefit analysis without limiting its scope, investor
ordering also offers a solution that sidesteps the academic debate about the merits
of cost-benefit analysis.
Investor ordering would also make for a more dynamic regulatory system.
Mandatory arrangements require retrospective analysis in order to determine
whether the arrangement creates undue costs and should therefore be amended or
repealed. The SEC conducts retrospective analysis of its regulations, 39 and the
37 See infra Part III.A.3, discussing Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2711–12 (2015); Financial
CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. §§ 311–321, 341 (2017).
38 See infra Part III.B.
39
Retrospective analysis of independent agency regulations was recommended by Exec. Order
No. 13,579, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,587 (July 14, 2011). Since that time the SEC has undertaken substantial
retrospective analysis of its regulations. See Release No. 33-10209, 81 Fed. Reg. 64,364 (Sept. 20,
2016) (listing 11 rules for review during the subsequent year); Release No. 33-9965, 80 Fed. Reg.

65,973 (Oct. 28, 2015) (listing 21 rules for review during the subsequent year); Release No. 339694, 79 Fed. Reg. 77,975 (Dec. 29, 2014) (listing 25 rules for review during the subsequent
year); Release No. 33-9516, 79 Fed. Reg. 4,638 (Jan. 29, 2014) (listing 12 rules for review during
the subsequent year); Release No. 33-9370, 77 Fed. Reg. 71,743 (Dec. 4, 2012) (listing 9 rules
for review during the subsequent year); Release No. 33-9284, 76 Fed. Reg. 79,141 (Dec. 21,
2011) (listing 17 rules for review during the subsequent year).
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Financial CHOICE Act would require more stringent retrospective analysis.40
Since retrospective analysis is merely backward-looking cost-benefit analysis, it
involves many of the same difficulties and costs. Investor ordering substantially
reduces the need for retrospective analysis. Where a default arrangement imposes
significant costs on corporations, those corporations will simply switch to an
alternative arrangement. The value or cost of investor ordered regulations can
therefore be evaluated by considering the number of corporations that remain
bound by the arrangement. This provides a ready, automatic, and incontrovertible
measure of an arrangement’s value, and substantially replaces the need to
undertake retrospective analysis.
To the extent retrospective analysis remains necessary, it is much easier and
less costly for investor ordered regulations than for mandatory regulations.
Investor ordering creates additional information regarding firms’ choices of
arrangements, which can be used in retrospective analysis. Variations in outcomes
among corporations with different arrangements provide some evidence of the
effects of those arrangements, although endogeneity concerns make these difficult
to disentangle from the effects of the underlying factors that led to the switching.
Investor ordering would also facilitate SEC experimentation with potential rules.
Taken together, these benefits would result in a more dynamic regulatory system,
with greater capacity to self-adjust towards optimal arrangements.
Collectively, these benefits make the case that the SEC should implement
investor ordering by default for all categories of corporations where institutional
investors have majority voting power, unless a regulation would have substantial
externalities that institutional investors would not internalize. This Article offers
concrete suggestions as to how the SEC should implement investor ordering, and
suggests possible initial candidates for investor ordered regulation and
deregulation. Switching from default arrangements should not be done by charter
or bylaw amendments, but instead by a bespoke process specified in SEC
regulations. Switching would require approval of outside shareholders at
corporations’ annual meetings. Bespoke switching would allow the SEC to finetune switching requirements, and to include other features that it considers
desirable. These may include “sunsets” on switching decisions, or requirements
for post-initial public offering (IPO) approval of switching decisions. The SEC’s
economic analysis could reduce corporations’ decision costs by analyzing
considerations that are generalizable to many corporations.
Prime candidates for investor ordered regulations are those on which there is
disagreement about the value of the regulation, or suggestions that the costs of the
regulation may outweigh its benefits. Potential or proposed rules that would
therefore be strong initial candidates for investor ordering include proxy access,
universal proxies, claw-backs, and disclosure of political spending. Switching will
be more costly where the default arrangement has been in place for a long period
40

See Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. § 316 (2017).
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of time. Therefore, recent rules may have greater benefit from investor ordered
deregulation than long-standing arrangements. Promising candidates for investor
ordering among recent rules include internal controls,41 conflict minerals,42 pay
ratios,43 and say-on-pay.44 Some long-standing regulations have recently been
attacked as costly for corporations,45 and could also be considered for deregulation
through investor ordering. These include requirements for disclosure of beneficial
ownership,46 and requirements to include shareholder proposals in proxy
statements.47
Although the focus of the Article is SEC regulation, its analysis has
implications for federal legislation and state corporate law.48 The SEC’s ability to
design optimal rules will be hampered by congressional mandates or prohibitions
on SEC regulations. Congress could improve the likelihood of optimal rule making
by refraining from such mandates or prohibitions, and thereby granting the SEC
greater rule making discretion.
While state corporation laws contain a lower proportion of mandatory
arrangements than SEC regulations, those mandatory arrangements that do exist
may not be optimal. State law switching requirements are also unlikely to result in
optimal arrangements. Switching arrangements in corporate bylaws generally does
not require investor approval,49 and switching charter provisions cannot be
initiated by investors. The content of most default arrangements in state
corporation laws means that managers are less likely to initiate switching. The
analysis in this Article suggests that state legislatures could improve corporate
arrangements by implementing investor ordering.
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows. Part I explains how the
justifications for mandatory regulation are contingent on the nature of investors,
and how they do not apply to corporations where choices of arrangements are
controlled by institutional investors, as is now the case. Part II demonstrates the
investor value case for investor ordering and considers potential limitations. Part
III explains how the requirements for cost-benefit analysis, coupled with the
41

See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-15, 240.15d-15 (2017).
See id. § 240.13p-1 (2017).
43 See id. § 229.402(u) (2017).
44 See id. § 240.14a-21 (2017).
45 See, e.g., Adam O. Emmerich, Theodore N. Mirvis, Eric S. Robinson & William Savitt, Fair
Markets and Fair Disclosure: Some Thoughts on the Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, and the
Use and Abuse of Shareholder Power, 3 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 135, 140 (2013) (calling for revision of
blockholder disclosure); see also Bus. Roundtable, Responsible Shareholder
Engagement & Long-Term Value Creation: Modernizing the Shareholder
Proposal Process (2016), http://businessroundtable.org/resources/responsible-shareholderengagement-long-term-value-creation (calling for revision of shareholder proposal rules).
46 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1 – 240.13d-2 (2017).
47 Id. § 240.14a-8 (2017).
48 See infra Part V.D.
49 See Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration Clauses in Corporate
Charters and Bylaws, 104 Geo. L.J. 583, 589 (2016); Jill E. Fisch, Governance by Contract: The
Implications for Corporate Bylaws, 106 Calif. L. Rev. 8 (forthcoming 2018).
42
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investor value case for investor ordering, likely require the SEC to implement
investor ordering, and how investor ordering would reduce the cost of cost-benefit
analysis. Part IV explains how investor ordering would improve retrospective
analysis of regulations, and thereby create a more dynamic regulatory system.
Given these benefits, Part V explains how the SEC should implement investor
ordering, and describes the implications of investor ordering for state law and
federal legislation.
I. The Outdated Case for Mandatory Corporate
Regulations
Corporations are a blend of public law and private law. They are born out of
statute, but constitute relationships among private individuals and entities. This
leads to a foundational question of corporate law: how should corporate
arrangements be determined? Should public law require or prohibit certain
arrangements for corporations? Or should arrangements be privately ordered and
chosen by the private constituents of the corporation?
This question has been the subject of voluminous scholarship, spanning the
fields of law, economics, finance, and accounting. Rather than trying to
recapitulate this debate, I take as given that there are valid justifications for
corporate arrangements to be determined by private ordering,50 and valid
justifications for corporate arrangements to be set by mandatory regulations.51 .
These justifications are described briefly in section A.
This Article contributes to this core debate by adding the observation that the
applicability of these justifications will depend on the nature of the investors in the
corporations in question. This claim is developed in section B. Mandatory
corporate rules are justified where the investors that choose corporate
arrangements have incentives to choose arrangements that are not optimal for the
corporation, or for the capital markets more generally.
However, as section C describes, the rise of institutional investors means that
they now control a significant majority of the shares of U.S. corporations.
Institutional investors have the power and the incentives to choose corporate
arrangements that are optimal for investors in the corporation, and optimal for
investors in other corporations. The rise of institutional investors therefore
substantially limits the case for mandatory corporate regulation to situations where
institutional investors do not control corporate arrangements or where there are
potential social externalities that institutional investors are unlikely to internalize.

50

E.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 7.
See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 13, at 1823; John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic
Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 Va. L. Rev. 717, 722 (1984); Bebchuk, supra note 13,
at 1823; Eisenberg, supra note 1,1, at 1499; Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate
Law, 89. Colum. L. Rev. 1549, 1554 (1989).
51
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A. The Case for Mandatory Corporate Regulations
Before examining the case for mandatory regulations, it is worth considering
the alternative, the case for private ordering. The case for private ordering starts
from the premise that private parties are in the best position to choose their own
arrangements. Different managers and different combinations of investors make
up different corporations, and for each of these sets of corporate constituents there
will be slightly different arrangements that are optimal.52 These corporate
constituents will understand which arrangements are optimal better than a
potential regulator,53 and will have better incentives than the regulator to choose
those arrangements.54
The case for mandatory corporate rules counters with several reasons why the
case for private ordering may not always apply:55
1. Externalities. Corporate arrangements have effects on other corporations,
other investors, and other third parties.56 Many of these are externalities: the
corporate constituents will not take these effects into account when determining
which arrangement will be privately optimal for the corporation.57
2. Agency Costs. The constituents determining corporate arrangements include
investors and managers. Managers operate the corporation on behalf of investors.
However, managers will have private incentives to take actions that are not optimal
for investors.58 In some cases it may be too difficult or costly for managers and
investors to contract to prevent these actions.59 Mandatory regulation may provide

52

E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 Colum. L. Rev.
1416, 1418 (1989) (“No one set of terms will be best for all . . . .”).
53 E.g., Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law Articles
and Comments, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1703, 1715 (1989). Dean Clark does point out that regulators
may have a role in setting rules that are more likely to apply to all corporations. See id. at 1718.
54 Regulators may be subject to “capture” by other constituencies that would lead them to choose
arrangements that are not optimal. E.g., James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The
Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy
(Liberty Fund, 1962); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. &
Mgmt. Sci. 3, 4 (1971) (considering economic regulation).
55 See, e.g., Leuz & Wysocki, supra note 8, at 16–21 (considering these rationales in the context of
mandatory disclosure rules).
56 See, e.g., Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 Va. L.
Rev. 757, 762 (1995); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in
Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 Va. L. Rev. 713, 719, 725 (1997).
57 See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 1405; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance
in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1618, 1677 (1989) (considering
corporate arrangements more generally); Coffee, supra note 51, at 723 (considering externalities from
disclosure).
58 E.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 308 (1976).
59 E.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 7.
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a means for the parties to reach a preferable arrangement that they could not
achieve themselves through bargaining.60
3. Economies of Scale. Without regulation, every set of corporate constituents
needs to engage in costly and duplicative bargaining to establish their optimal
arrangements. By mandating uniform arrangements, regulation obviates this
duplication and its cost. The uniformity of these arrangements also has positive
externalities for investors and others in the capital markets.61
B. Mandatory Corporate Regulations and the Nature of Investors
This section makes clear that the agency cost and externality justifications for
mandatory regulations or private ordering are not absolute.62 Rather, their
application depends on the nature of the corporate constituents and their
incentives, and, in particular, the nature of the investors in the corporation.
Investors fall into several categories that have different incentives with respect to
externalities and agency costs.
Investors may be insiders or outsiders. Insiders, such as corporate managers
and controlling shareholders, have the ability to extract private benefits from the
corporation. To the extent that an arrangement may permit agency costs, if inside
investors control the choice among comparable arrangements, they will choose the
arrangement that allows them the greatest private benefits. That arrangement will
not be in the interests of the outside investors in the corporation.
Outside investors may hold small stakes in the corporation (“retail investors”)
or large stakes (“blockholders”). Given their small stakes and commensurately
small influence on voting outcomes, it is not rational for retail investors to inform
themselves about corporate decisions or to vote on those decisions.63 Where retail
investors control the choice of corporate arrangements, there is a significant
possibility that their lack of information may lead them to choose arrangements
that are against their own interests, such as arrangements that allows insiders to
divert greater private benefits from the corporation.64
Outside blockholders may either hold their shares in the company as part of a
broadly diversified portfolio of many corporations, or they may hold an
undiversified interest, with a significant proportion of their assets concentrated in
the corporation. Given the size of their stake, undiversified outside blockholders
will have incentives to inform themselves about corporate arrangements. Where
undiversified outside blockholders are responsible for choosing corporate
60

See, e.g., Edward Rock, Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible Commitment Theory of
Mandatory Disclosure, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 675, 686–87 (2002).
61 See Klausner, supra note 56, at 762; Kahan & Klausner, supra note 56, at 719, 725.
62 The economies of scale justification for mandatory regulations is considered in Section II.C.6,
infra.)
63 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 520, 527
(1990).
64 See generally Bebchuk, supra note 13, at 1839.
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arrangements, they will choose those arrangements that are privately optimal for
the investors in the corporation.65
Diversified blockholders largely consist of institutional investors. Institutional
investors are investment intermediaries that invest on behalf of other investors,
and include pension funds, mutual funds, and investment managers.66 They hold
broadly diversified portfolios that include interests in hundreds or thousands of
corporations, with each corporation making up a very small share of the portfolio.
When a corporate arrangement has effects on other corporations, institutional
investors are also likely to be invested in those other corporations, and are therefore
likely to take other effects on those corporations into account in determining which
arrangements they prefer.
Whether or not mandating a particular arrangement for corporations is
justified will depend on whether the arrangement may have externalities or agency
costs, and whether the choice of arrangement by those corporations would
otherwise be controlled by insiders, retail investors, undiversified outside
blockholders, or institutional investors. Mandatory arrangements will be justified
in two situations. First, if an arrangement would allow agency costs, a mandatory
arrangement will be justified if insiders choose corporate arrangements, or if retail
investors choose arrangements and may choose the arrangement that insiders
prefer rather than the optimal arrangement. Second, if an arrangement has
externalities to other corporations and their investors, a mandatory arrangement
will be justified if undiversified blockholders choose arrangements, or if insiders or
retail investors choose arrangements: without a mandatory arrangement, each of
these types of investors would all otherwise choose arrangements that would be
privately optimal for the corporation, but which would not take into account any
externalities.
These conclusions are illustrated in Table 1.

65 This assumes that outside investors cannot protect themselves ex ante from such changes of
arrangements, for example, by paying less at the IPO where they expect that such changes are likely
to occur. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 52, at 1421. If investors could perfectly protect
themselves they would be indifferent regarding the choice of corporate arrangements.
66 See, e.g., Hirst, supra note 11, at 5.
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Table 1. Justifications for Mandatory Arrangements
Type of Investor Choosing Arrangements
Retail
Investors

Insiders
Agency
Costs
No
Agency
Costs

Externalities
No Externalities
Externalities

Agency Costs &
Externalities

Undiversified
Outside
Blockholders

Institutional
Investors

Externalities

Agency Costs
Externalities

No Externalities

The blank cells in Table 1 show that the above justifications for mandatory
rules will not apply in two circumstances. Mandatory arrangements will not be
justified if there are no agency costs and no externalities. In that case, no matter
which type of investor chooses corporate arrangements, they will choose the
optimal arrangement.67
Most importantly, if arrangements are chosen by institutional investors, then
they will choose arrangements that are optimal for the corporation and also for the
capital markets, and mandatory regulation will not be justified on the grounds of
either externalities or agency costs.
C. The Nature of Investors in the Modern Corporation
When the federal securities laws were enacted, corporate share registers were
dominated by either dispersed retail investors, or by inside investors.68 As a result,
mandatory rules were justified on the grounds of preventing agency costs69 and
externalities.70
Since that time, the nature of corporate investment has been transformed by
the rise of institutional investors.71 Retirement savings have shifted to the equity
67 A variation on this scenario, the claim that legal and market mechanisms effectively incentivize
corporate constituents to take agency costs and externalities into account in choosing arrangements,
corresponds to the position taken by some “contractarians” in the debate on contractual freedom in
corporate law. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response
to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1990).
68 See generally Berle & Means, supra note 14.
69 See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 8, at 1048.
70 See generally Arthur C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (1920).
71 For a discussion of the rise of institutional investors, see Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst, supra note
16. Additional works discuss the rise of institutional investors. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents
Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 811 (1992); Black,
supra note 63; William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition, Regulatory
Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 1861 (1995); Paul H. Edelman, Randall
S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 1359 (2014); Franklin R. Edwards, R. Glenn Hubbard & Robert B. Thompson, The
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markets, and from direct investment to investment intermediated by institutional
investors.72 The great majority of U.S. corporations now have most of their
outstanding shares held by institutional investors. Figure 1(a) shows the number of
U.S. corporations with different levels of institutional ownership.

Number of Corporations

Figure 1(a): Institutional Ownership
of Corporations73

Figure 1(b). Institutional Ownership
as Proportion of Shares Voted74
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For 72% of corporations, institutional investors own more than 50% of
outstanding shares. Institutional investors control less than 25% of outstanding
shares for only 9% of corporations, most of which are small corporations.
The predominance of institutional investor control is even more pronounced
considering that many retail investors do not vote in corporate elections.75 As a
result, there will be significantly fewer cases where institutional investors do not
control a majority of the shares actually voted in corporate elections. Figure 1(b)
Growth of Institutional Stock Ownership: A Promise Unfulfilled, 13 J. Applied Corp. Fin. 92
(2000); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors
and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 863 (2013); Edward B. Rock, The
Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 Geo. L.J. 445 (1991).
72 For a discussion of the main factors underlying this process, see Gilson & Gordon, supra note
71, at 878.
73 Ownership data for Figure 1(a) and Figure 1(b) is as of Dec. 31, 2016, and is derived from the
FactSet Ownership database (accessed August 6, 2017), which aggregates ownership of institutional
investors from SEC filings. Because multiple institutional investors may have control over the same
investments, there may be some double-counting and inflation of investor ownership, explaining the
reported institutional ownership over 1.
74 Voting data in Figure 1(b) is derived from FactSet SharkRepellent (accessed July 29, 2017). To
permit comparison among corporations, Figure 1(b) excludes corporations with classes of shares with
different voting rights.
75 The participation rate of retail investors in corporate elections in the second half of 2016 was
28%, compared to 83% for institutional investors. ProxyPulse, 2017 Proxy Season Preview
3 (2017), https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/broadridge-2017-proxy-season-preview.pdf.
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shows institutional ownership as a proportion of the total number of shares voted
for director elections at corporations’ 2016 annual meetings. For 86% of
corporations, shares owned by institutional investors constitute more than 50% of
the shares voted at those corporations’ 2016 annual meetings. For only 4% of
corporations did institutional investors control less than 25% of shares voted at
corporations’ 2016 annual meetings.
* * *
The implications for whether corporate arrangements should be set by
mandatory rules or by private ordering are clear. Mandatory ordering will only be
justified in two circumstances: First, at those corporations where institutional
investors may not control the choice of corporate arrangements, which situations
are likely to be the very smallest corporations. Second, those few corporate
regulations that may involve externalities that institutional investors will not take
into account in choosing optimal arrangements. Part II demonstrates that investor
ordering will create superior outcomes in those circumstances where mandatory
rules are not justified.
II. The Investor Value Case for Investor Ordering
The central claim of this Article is that, where mandatory rules are no longer
justified because investors can effectively choose corporate arrangements,
regulators should let them. This Part first describes how such investor ordering
would function, and then demonstrates how it would result in the same or greater
aggregate net benefit as would mandatory rules.
A. Investor Ordering
The discussion in Part I compared mandatory regulations to private ordering.
But the nature of private ordering depends on who does the ordering, and how.
The foundational debate on contractual freedom in corporate law has generally
assumed that managers would effectively determine private ordering decisions.76
This Article puts forward an alternative—investor ordering. This section sets out
a series of principles that define how investor ordering would function.77 The
principles are indivisible—dispensing any principle would invalidate the case that
investor ordering creates superior value. The principles for investor ordering
described here build on those proposed by Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani for

76

See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 13, at 1839.
This section does not consider how these principles would be implemented into law or the
practical decisions that would entail. Those questions are covered later in this Article. See infra Part
V.
77
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state law rules78 and the application of those principles that several authors have
subsequently proposed for particular corporate regulations.79
Investor ordered arrangements are privately ordered in that they have a
particular arrangement as a default, but corporations are permitted to switch to an
alternative arrangement. Fundamental to a rule being investor ordered is that
switching decisions are approved by the outside investors of public corporations.
Investor ordering focuses on corporate arrangements—those that determine
the relationships among managers and investors. For simplicity, this Part will refer
to binary arrangements, although similar principles apply to arrangements that
have more than two possible values.80 For a binary arrangement, a corporation can
either have the arrangement or not have the arrangement, which I refer to as having
a “no-arrangement.”81
Mandatory rules may require an arrangement or prohibit an arrangement
(equivalent to requiring a no-arrangement). In contrast, investor ordered rules are
permitted but not required, so corporations can choose to switch from the default.
If the arrangement is the default, corporations are bound by the arrangement unless
they choose to opt out, in which case they are not bound. Alternatively, if noarrangement is the default, corporations are not bound unless they choose to opt
in. The nature of opt-out and opt-in decisions thus depends on the nature of the
default.82 To avoid confusion, I use “switching” to refer to both opt-out decisions
and opt-in decisions without having to specify the nature of the default.
1. Preconditions
Several preconditions for investor ordering follow from its definition. Investor
ordering will only apply where the subjects of a regulation are corporations with
investors. Investor ordering will not apply to the regulation of other capital market
participants such as broker-dealers, investment advisors, or securities exchanges.
Investor ordering will also not apply where corporations do not have a body of
78 See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 24, at 492 (describing the choice of optimal defaults); see
also Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 1412 (setting out a preliminary version of this approach).
79 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate, 65 Bus.
Law. 329, 332–33 (2010) (proposing private ordering of federal proxy access regulations by
investors); Brett H. McDonnell, Setting Optimal Rules for Shareholder Proxy Access, 43 Ariz. St.
L.J. 67, 71 (2011) (making a similar proposal with respect to proxy access); Joshua Mitts, A Private
Ordering Solution to Blockholder Disclosure, 35 N.C. Cent. L. Rev. 203, 241 (2013) (suggesting
private ordering of the SEC’s blockholder disclosure rules by investors). Luca Enriques, Ron Gilson
and Allessio Pacces have also suggested private ordering of takeover regulations by investors. See
Luca Enriques, Ronald J. Gilson & Alessio M. Pacces, The Case for an Unbiased Takeover Law (with
an Application to the European Union), 4 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 85, 88 (2014).
80 The implementation of investor ordering for non-binary arrangements is discussed infra Part
V.A.7.
81 Having a “no-arrangement” is the jural opposite of having an arrangement, and follows
Hohfeld’s use of “no-right” as the jural opposite of a right. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J. 16, 30 (1913).
82 Opting out of an arrangement default is the opposite of opting out of a no-arrangement default,
and the same as opting in to a no-arrangement default.
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public equity investors. Investor ordering, therefore, does not apply to closely held
corporations83 or to corporations in the hands of their creditors.
2. Switching Arrangements
Any decision regarding whether to switch arrangements can be split into two
components, initiation and approval.84 Investor ordering permits switching to be
initiated by either managers or investors, but requires investor approval for
switching. In this respect it differs from “manager ordering,” whereby switching
decisions can be unilaterally approved by managers.
For approval of switching decisions, investor ordering requires, at a
minimum,85 the approval of a majority of votes cast by all shareholders,86 and the
approval of a majority of votes cast by outside shareholders. The latter approval
requirement is akin to the concept of a “majority-of-the-minority” in Delaware
corporate law.87 It excludes insiders—directors, managers, and beneficial holders
of more than 10% of the equity of the corporation88 (since they can be assumed to
have some ability to control the affairs of the corporation), as well as their
immediate families and any entities they control. Requiring the approval of outside
investors prevents inside investors from choosing corporate arrangements that
would not be optimal for the corporation. These approvals must be made at a
properly constituted meeting of shareholders.89 Within these constraints the
switching process would aim to minimize the cost of switching.
If the SEC wishes, it could also require that switching decisions made prior to
an IPO be approved by public shareholders after the IPO. This possibility is
discussed further in Part V.A.4. There are conceptual reasons why this may be
consistent with the rationale for investor ordering, but also arguments against
requiring post-IPO approval. However, the number of companies that this would

83 The treatment of corporate arrangements put in place before a corporation goes public is
discussed in Part V.A.4.
84 These correspond to “agenda setting” and “veto” within the political systems literature. See,
e.g., George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work 2
(2002).
85 Since this would be a minimum constraint, corporations could impose more stringent (but not
less stringent) requirements for approval of switching, although imposing such rules would also
require investor approval.
86 Where the approval requirement is a majority of votes cast, the failure of retail investors to vote
will not influence the outcome. For a discussion of the effects of non-voting where the vote
requirement is a majority of outstanding shares, see Scott Hirst, Frozen Charters, 34 Yale J. Reg.
91, 95–96 (2017).
87 See, e.g., Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 654 (Del. 2014) (holding that majorityof-the-minority approval creates a presumption that a transaction with a controller is fair to
investors).
88 This definition follows that for which disclosure is required under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2012).
89 This includes satisfaction of the corporation’s quorum requirements.
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apply to is very small.90 I therefore focus instead on the switching decisions of
existing corporations, which would form the overwhelming majority of
corporations to which investor ordering would apply.
3. Manager-Initiation-Maximizing Defaults
In order to ensure that investors have the opportunity to consider potentially
value-enhancing switches, defaults need to be set so as to maximize the chance that
switching will be initiated. Managers are likely to be able to initiate switching with
lower costs than investors because they control the operations of the corporation,
including its proxy statement and annual meeting, and can therefore easily put
forward switching proposals for approval. The regulator should thus select the
default arrangements that would most encourage managers to initiate switching if
it is value-enhancing.
Managers will have incentives to move from arrangements that are more
restrictive of their activities (or that offer them fewer private benefits) to
arrangements that are less restrictive (or offer greater private benefits). However,
they will have private incentives against moving from less-manager-restrictive
arrangements to more-manager-restrictive arrangements.91 Even if such switches
were value-enhancing for the corporation, managers may not initiate them. As a
result, all other things being equal, the optimal default rule is likely to be the
plausible arrangement that is most restrictive of managers, or least privately
beneficial for managers.92
B. The Investor Value Case for Investor Ordering
This section sets out an informal analysis that demonstrates the proposition
that, assuming that there are no potential externalities from arrangements that are
not internalized by institutional investors,93 investor ordered regulations will
produce the same or greater aggregate net value for investors as would mandatory
regulations.
90

See, e.g., Xiaohui Gao, Jay R. Ritter & Zhongyan Zhu, Where Have All the IPOs Gone?, 48 J.
Fin. & Quantitative Analysis 1663, 1663 (2013) (observing an average of “99 IPOs per year
during 2001-2012”). The small number of IPOs compares to more than at least 3,500 public
corporations every year in that period. See Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi, & René M. Stulz, The
U.S. Listing Gap, 123 J. Fin. Econ. 464, 473 tbl.3 (2017).
91 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 24, at 502–03.
92 This follows the “reversible defaults approach” put forward in Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra
note 24, at 490. An alternative criterion for defaults could be which defaults are more protective of
investors, including from agency costs of managers. Investor protectiveness (vis-à-vis managers) will
often be related to manager-restrictiveness. However, choosing the most investor protective default
may not always maximize the likelihood that managers will initiate switching from that arrangement
to a less investor-protecting arrangement, since some investor protections might also act to protect
managers more than their plausible alternatives.
93 A potential externality is a cost or benefit to another party that results from a choice, and which
would be an externality if it were not taken into account (“internalized”) by the parties making the
choice.
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To illustrate the investor value case, assume that a regulator has the power to
enact a regulation that applies to corporations. The regulation will only have an
effect if it is enacted, and the aggregate effect of the regulation will be the sum of
the effects of the regulation on each corporation in the capital market. The
regulation may be mandatory, in which case it will apply to all corporations.
Alternatively, if the regulation permits private ordering, each corporation can
switch from the default arrangement to no-arrangement, in which case the net
benefit to the corporation from the rule will be zero, less the cost of switching.94
Corporations will switch arrangements if the arrangement has a net cost to the
corporation (i.e., the net benefit of the arrangement to the corporation is negative),
and the net cost is more than the cost of opting out.
The discussion below initially assumes that there are no agency costs and no
externalities to other investors; the effects of relaxing these assumptions are then
discussed in Part II.B.5 and Part II.B.6, respectively. Where there are no agency
costs or externalities, there will be no difference between the arrangements chosen
by institutional investors and other investors, so investor ordered rules will be the
same as other privately ordered rules.95 Where there are agency costs or
externalities, it is further assumed that institutional investors control the choice of
corporate arrangements.
1. One Size Fits All. Consider first the situation where a particular arrangement
rule has the same directional effect on all corporations in the capital market. Even
if the exact net effects of an arrangement on corporations vary, if the arrangement
has positive net benefits for all corporations, or net costs that are less than the cost
of switching for those corporations, no corporations will switch arrangements, and
an investor ordered regulation will have the same aggregate net benefit as a
mandatory regulation.
To illustrate, consider a hypothetical capital market in which there are only
four corporations, A, B, C, and D. Assume that an arrangement results in net
benefits to {A, B, C, D} of {10, 20, 40, 40} compared to no-arrangement. Since the
arrangement has positive net benefits for all corporations, no corporations would
opt out even if they were permitted to do so, and the aggregate net benefit will be
110 whether the rule is mandatory or privately ordered.
Given that rules are made under conditions of uncertainty, the regulator may
require an arrangement that it expected to be beneficial, but which turns out to be
more costly for all corporations than the cost of switching arrangements. If the rule
is investor ordered, each corporation will opt out of the rule. In this case, the
investor ordered regulation would have greater aggregate net benefits than a
mandatory rule.
94 In this framework, a mandatory rule can be considered to be equivalent to a privately ordered
rule with an infinite opt-out cost.
95 For consistency, I continue to use the term “investor ordering” to describe these private
ordering decisions.
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2. Heterogeneous Effects. Corporations are complex and varied, and differ in
many aspects that potentially affect the impact of a corporate arrangement. As a
result, a single arrangement may not have the same directional effects for all
corporations.96 In these circumstances, an investor ordered rule will have greater
aggregate net benefits than a mandatory rule to the extent that the regulation
results in net costs to corporations that are greater than the switching costs for
those corporations.
To illustrate, consider an arrangement that results in net benefits to {A, B, C,
D} of {-20, -10, 40, 40} compared to no-arrangement. A mandatory rule would
have an aggregate net benefit of 50. But if switching were permitted and had a cost
of 15, A would opt out, improving its outcome from -20 to -15, and the aggregate
net benefit would be 55. If switching had a cost of 5, B would also opt out, and the
aggregate net benefit of the rule would be 70.
With an investor ordered regulation, each corporation effectively has an option
to switch arrangements, with the exercise price being the switching cost, and the
payoff being the net cost of the chosen arrangement to the corporation.97 The
option is valuable when it is “in the money”—when an arrangement has greater
net costs than the switching cost. The option has zero value when it is “out of the
money”—when the net costs of the arrangement are less than the cost of opting
out. Investor ordering will be valuable to the extent that it is expected to result in
in-the-money options.
Investor ordering effectively caps the net cost of an arrangement to
corporations at the switching cost, without affecting situations where the
arrangement has positive net benefit. The lower the switching cost, the lower the
downside cap on the regulation, and the greater the potential positive net benefit
from private ordering. The extent to which investor ordered regulations are
superior to mandatory regulations will increase with the expected aggregate net
costs from an arrangement. Expected aggregate net costs will increase with the
likelihood of net costs from an arrangement, and with the magnitude of the net
costs. Investor ordering will therefore be more valuable where corporations are
likely to have more heterogeneous effects from a particular arrangement, and
where there is greater uncertainty about the effects of the arrangement on
corporations.
3. Negative Aggregate Benefit Rules. Investor ordering will not just improve
regulations that would have positive net benefits if mandatory, but, given
sufficiently low switching costs, will create positive aggregate net benefits from
rules that would have had negative aggregate net benefits if they were mandatory.
For instance, if an arrangement had net benefits of {-30, -20, 10, 30}, a mandatory
rule would have an aggregate net benefit of -10. However, if opting out were
96

See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 7.
Consideration of investor ordering within an option framework makes clear the underlying
similarity of investor ordering to the “real-option” analysis put forward by Yoon-Ho Alex Lee. See
Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, An Options Approach to Agency Rulemaking Essay, 65 Admin. L. Rev. 881, 887
(2013).
97
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permitted and had a cost of 5, A and B would opt out, and the aggregate net benefit
of the rule would be 30.
4. Agency Costs. So far, corporations have been analyzed as unitary entities.
However, the interests—and therefore the decisions—of managers are not
necessarily aligned with those of investors for all arrangements. Of course, if
managers always act in the best interests of investors, then they will make the same
choice of arrangements as investors. This might be the case if fiduciary duties,
executive compensation, or other governance arrangements in place at the
corporation perfectly align the interests of managers and investors. However, as
discussed in Part I.A, agency costs may cause a divergence in the incentives of
managers and investors, and therefore in their choices with respect to particular
corporate arrangements. Certain arrangements may be more prone to agency costs
than others. For instance, a regulation that imposes additional accountability
requirements on managers will be costly for managers, but may benefit investors.
Given potential divergence between investor interests and manager interests
regarding these arrangements, investor ordered regulations will produce the same
or greater aggregate net benefit compared to manager ordered regulations.98
To illustrate, consider an arrangement that would have benefits to the
investors of {A, B, C, and D} of {-20, -10, 30, 40}, and to the managers of {A, B,
C, and D} of {2, -2, -2, 2}. If the rule is privately ordered with switching costs of 5
and managers control the switching decision, A and D will opt out, but B and C will
not, with an aggregate net benefit of 10. If investors control the opt-out decision, A
and B will opt out, with an aggregate net benefit of 60. Where the directions of
investor interests and manager interests are perfectly correlated, managers will opt
out in the same cases as investors, and the results of manager ordering and investor
ordering will be the same. Where the direction of manager interests and investor
interests are less than perfectly correlated, management ordering will produce
lower investor value than investor ordering.
In some cases, where the direction of investor interests and manager interests
are negatively correlated, manager ordering may result in lower net aggregate
benefit than a mandatory rule, and possibly even lower net aggregate benefit than
no rule.99 For instance, in the example above, had the regulation been mandatory,
the net aggregate benefit would have been 40. If management payoffs were {2, 2, 2, -2} and the rule were management ordered, then C and D would opt out, and
the net aggregate benefit would be -40.
5. Default Arrangements. So far the analysis has been confined to opting out of
a particular arrangement. An investor ordered rule could also be designed to permit
98 This analysis disregards the welfare effects on managers. A full welfare analysis would
aggregate the welfare effects on managers and investors. However, in most publicly owned
corporations the value invested by investors is much greater than that of managers. The effect on
investors is therefore likely to be several orders of magnitude greater than the effect on managers.
This would not be the case where a manager is also a significant inside investor in a corporation.
99 See Bebchuk, supra note 13, at 1836.
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opting in from a no-arrangement default. Where switching is costless, opting out
of an arrangement and opting in from no-arrangement will both lead to the optimal
result.100 Consider an arrangement with benefits of {-20, 10, 10, 20}. If the
arrangement is the default, and corporations can opt out with no cost, A will opt
out, with an aggregate net benefit of 40. If there is a no-arrangement default and
the arrangement can be opted into with no cost, corporations B, C, and D would
opt in, with the same net benefits of 40. However, wherever switching is costly, or
where switching does not take place with certainty when it would increase investor
value, different default choices will have different outcomes.
If switching takes place with certainty when it increases investor value, the
optimal rule will be the one that minimizes aggregate switching costs across all
corporations. In the above example, with payoffs of {-20, 10, 10, 20}, if switching
costs 5, then permitting opting out from a default arrangement is optimal, as it will
result in switching costs of 5 and an aggregate net benefit of 35, rather than
switching costs of 15 and an aggregate net benefit of 25 for opting in from a noarrangement default. Alternatively, consider an arrangement with benefits of {-20,
-10, 10, 20}, where opting in costs 8 and opting out costs 5. Opting out from a
default arrangement would be preferable as it would result in switching costs of 10
rather than 16, and a net benefit of 20 rather than 14.
If switching takes place with certainty when it improves net benefits, both
opting out from a default arrangement and opting in from a no-arrangement will
result in the same or greater aggregate net benefit as a mandatory rule. However,
where optimal switching is not certain, either opting out from a default
arrangement or opting in from a no-default arrangement (but not both) may be
inferior to a mandatory rule. Whether the investor ordered rule is superior to a
mandatory rule therefore depends on the choice of the default arrangement.
Consider a regulation in a market with 10 corporations, where 8 corporations of
type A would have a net benefit of 10, and 2 corporations of type B would have a
net benefit of -10, i.e., {10 × 8, -10 × 2}. Assume that switching has zero cost, but
only takes place in 50% of the cases where it increases investor value. Opting out
from a default arrangement would have an aggregate net benefit of 70, and would
be superior to a mandatory rule, which would have an aggregate net benefit of 60.
However, opting in from no-arrangement would have an aggregate net benefit of
40, and would be inferior to the mandatory rule. For the proposition that investor
ordered rules are the same or better than mandatory rules to hold, the investor
ordered rule must therefore be well-designed, and must incorporate the superior
default arrangement.
6. Externalities. A corporation’s arrangements may have externalities—they
may affect those other than the current investors in the corporation. This would
include not just investors in other corporations, but also future investors in the
corporation (or in other corporations). If potential externalities are not taken into
100 This is a simple application of the Coase Theorem. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost,
3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
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account (internalized) by the investors that choose corporate arrangements, they
could result in an investor ordered rule being inferior to a mandatory rule.
To illustrate, consider an arrangement with net benefits to corporations {A, B,
C, D} of {-15, -10, 10, 15}, and assume that investors in each corporation receive
benefits of 5 for each other corporation that has the arrangement.101 If there is a
mandatory rule requiring the arrangement, in addition to the effects from their own
corporation having the arrangement, the net benefits to investors in each
corporation of other corporations having the arrangement will be {15, 15, 15, 15}, so
the regulation will have an aggregate net benefit of 60. If the rule is investor ordered
with opt-out costs of 5, A and B will opt out, so aggregate net benefits would be 15,
plus net benefits to each corporation of other corporations being bound of {10, 10,
5, 5}, resulting in an aggregate net benefit from the regulation of 45.
C. Potential Limitations of the Investor Value Case for Investor Ordering
This section considers the potential ways in which the investor value case for
investor ordering may fail, such that investor ordering may have lower aggregate
net benefits than mandatory regulation. Investor ordering will have the same or
greater aggregate net benefit than a mandatory rule with the same defaults.102
However, optimal defaults for investor ordering will be different from optimal
defaults for mandatory rules, because investor ordering defaults are chosen
assuming that corporations will switch arrangements when it is optimal to do so.103
If those corporations do not switch when it would be optimal to do so, an investor
ordered rule may have lower aggregate net benefits than a mandatory regulation.
The first four limitations therefore consider situations that may lead to sub-optimal
switching: Part II.C.1 considers the possibility of sub-optimal initiation, and Part
II.C.2 through Part II.C.4 consider the possibility of sub-optimal vetoes of
switching decisions. Part II.C.5 and Part II.C.6 consider additional costs that might
lead investor ordering to be inferior to mandatory rules.
1. Insufficient Initiation of Optimal Switching
One potential cause of insufficient switching is insufficient initiation of optimal
switches. Michael Klausner and Michal Barzuza each describe evidence that,
under current state law rules, corporations fail to switch arrangements to those that
investors consider optimal.104 However, that failure to switch takes place against
the current backdrop of default rules that are less manager restrictive than the
alternative. As a result, managers do not have significant incentives to initiate
switching, and initiation is left to investors. As will be discussed in Part II.C.3,
101 A similar rationale would hold for the converse arrangement—if there are net benefits to
investors in A if A had an arrangement, but net cost to investors in B, C, and D from A having that
arrangement.
102 This assumes that there are no significant decision costs, which is discussed in Part II.C.6.
103 Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 1411.
104 Klausner, supra note 23, at 1349; Barzuza, supra note 23, at 5.
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investors have incentives to under-initiate value-enhancing switching.105 Investor
ordering therefore requires the default that will maximize initiation of switching by
managers. This will generally be the plausible arrangement most restrictive of
managers. With such defaults, managers will have strong incentives to initiate
switching, and the problem that Professors Klausner and Barzuza observe would
be remedied.
An illustration of manager initiation where there are manager-restrictive
defaults can be seen in the period after the Delaware Supreme Court imposed
liability on outside directors for breach of the duty of care in Smith v. Van
Gorkom.106 The Delaware legislature subsequently permitted corporations to opt
out of such liability. At the vast majority of corporations, managers initiated charter
amendments to take advantage of this provision, opting out of liability.107
2. Institutional Investors Not Having a Veto
If institutional investors do not have a veto right at particular corporations they
will not be able to prevent any value-decreasing switches that might be initiated by
managers.108 Because investor ordering decisions require the majority approval of
outside investors, the only way that institutional investors may not have a veto is if
they do not control a majority of shares held by outside investors. This would be
the case if retail investors and outside blockholders with positions less than 10%
held a majority of the shares of the corporation.
Part I.C examined the extent to which institutional investors hold a majority of
the shares in Russell 3000 corporations. Requiring approval of outside investors
excludes from consideration insiders, and blockholders holding positions of more
than 10% of corporations. This leaves institutional investors, retail investors, and
blockholders with positions below 10%. Figure 2(a) shows the proportion of such
shares held by institutional investors.

105 See infra Part II.C.3. (citing Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Under-Supply
of Investor Stewardship (2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Business Law
Review)).
106 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del.
2009). Examples of manager-restrictive defaults are rare because manager-restrictive SEC rules are
invariably mandatory and state law defaults are generally less manager-restrictive.
107 Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39 Emory L.J.
1155, 1160 (1990) (observing that 90% of Delaware firms sampled opted out).
108 Of course, many managers will act only in the best interests of the corporation, even if they
have private incentives to the contrary, and will therefore not initiate value-reducing switches.
However, some managers may initiate such switches when it is in their own interests, and some
managers may mistakenly believe such switches to be in the interests of the corporation.
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Figure 2(a). Institutional Control of
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Figure 2(a) shows that institutional investors constitute a majority of shares
held by outside shareholders at 84% of corporations. At those corporations,
institutional investors would have a veto on choices of arrangements under
investor ordering. The proportion is even more pronounced considering retail
investors’ limited participation in voting. Institutional investors constitute more
than a majority of the outside investors that voted in annual meetings in 2016 at
97% of Russell 3000 corporations. This suggests that the number of corporations
where institutional investors do not have a veto is likely to be extremely limited.
The few firms where institutional investors may not have a veto are likely to be
very small firms, which have lower levels of institutional ownership. Small firms
represent a tiny proportion of total capital invested in corporations—the total value
of the smallest 20% of firms in the Russell 3000 is only 0.5% of the total value of
firms in the index. Rather than limit the adoption of rules that would be beneficial
for investors in 97% of corporations, the SEC could consider minimum size
thresholds for regulations, above which regulations would be investor ordered and
below which corporations would be bound by mandatory rules.
109

Ownership data for Figure 2(a) and Figure 2(b) is as of Dec. 31, 2016, and is derived from the
FactSet Ownership database (accessed August 6, 2017), which aggregates ownership of institutional
investors from SEC filings. The denominator of each figure excludes inside investors, and noninstitutional holders of more than 10% of equity. Because multiple institutional investors may have
control over the same investments, there may be some double counting and inflation of investor
ownership, explaining the reported institutional ownership over 1.
110 Voting data in Figure 2(b) is derived from FactSet SharkRepellent (accessed July 29, 2017). To
permit comparison among corporations, Figure 2(b) excludes corporations with classes of shares with
different voting rights.
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3. Institutional Investors Exercising (Privately) Sub-Optimal Vetoes
If institutional investors have a veto over switching arrangements, if they
systematically approve switches that are not privately optimal for the corporation,
or if they fail to approve switches that are privately optimal for the corporation,
then mandatory regulations may be superior to investor ordering.
Institutional investors are intermediaries that invest on behalf of other
investors.111 This creates the possibility for agency costs between the institution
and their own investors. These agency costs may systematically bias the switching
decisions made by institutional investors away from the switching decisions that
would be optimal for the corporation. While the potential for agency costs exists
with all kinds of institutional investors, it can be most clearly illustrated in the case
of the investment managers that manage diversified investment funds, like mutual
funds or exchange traded funds. Investment managers are also the largest
institutional investors and have the greatest influence on choices of arrangements.
There are several reasons to believe that investment managers may have
significant agency costs.112 They capture only a small proportion of value increases
that they create, meaning that they will have limited incentives to spend to identify
and initiate value-enhancing switching.113 Any increase in the value of companies
that investment managers create will be shared with their competitors. For index
funds—the largest investment managers—all of the value they create will be
shared with others that invest in the index,114 giving them no incentive to initiate
value-enhancing switches even though those would be beneficial to the company.
Even managers of actively managed investment funds will share most of any
increases in value with competitors, so they will have limited incentives to initiate
value-enhancing switches.115 However, while these factors will limit the willingness
of investment managers to initiate switching, they will not lead investment
managers to vote against the interests of their own investors on switches that have
already been initiated. Indeed, these agency costs make it more important that
defaults be chosen so as to maximize the likelihood that managers will initiate
value-enhancing switching.

111 The exact relationship between the intermediary and the beneficiaries varies with the type of
institutional investor. Investment managers may purchase shares of companies on behalf of particular
clients, in which case those shares will be owned by the particular client. Alternatively, investment
managers may manage investment funds which pool the assets of multiple investors and use those
assets to buy shares of companies, which are then owned by the investment fund. Pension funds buy
and own shares of companies, but have a duty to use the proceeds of those shares for their
beneficiaries.
112 See Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst, supra note 16, at 90.
113 Id. at 90, 99
114 Id.
115 Id. (discussing “closet indexing”); see also K.J. Martijn Cremers & Antti Petajisto, How Active
Is Your Fund Manager? A New Measure That Predicts Performance, 22 Rev. Fin. Stud. 3329, 3329
(2009).
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Investment managers also often offer business services to corporations, and
they may believe that taking positions that corporate managers disfavor would lead
corporations to reduce those services.116 This may reduce the willingness of
investment managers to oppose value-decreasing switching initiated by managers.
However, this has not prevented investment managers from adopting policies and
voting in favor of arrangements that managers have disfavored in the past. For
instance, although managers have reasons to prefer classified boards of directors to
annual elections,117 the largest investment managers have voting policies in favor
of annual elections, and routinely vote in favor of proposals to move to annual
elections.118 That such proposals receive large majorities despite management
opposition119 suggests that large investment managers are indeed willing to vote in
ways that corporate managers disfavor.
4. Institutional Investors Exercising (Publicly) Sub-Optimal Vetoes
Even if institutional investors make decisions that are optimal for the
corporation, mandatory regulations will be superior to investor ordering if there
are significant potential externalities from changes in corporate arrangements that
institutional investors do not internalize.
How might a corporation switching a particular arrangement affect investors
in other corporations? The most obvious example is network externalities. If an
arrangement has a network externality, the more corporations that have that
arrangement, the more valuable the arrangement becomes for each corporation
that has the arrangement. For instance, if a single corporation makes a particular
type of disclosure, it will be expensive for other market participants to interpret
that disclosure. However, the more corporations that adopt the disclosure, the
easier it will be to compare corporations on that disclosure measure, and the more
worthwhile it will be for others to learn how to interpret the measure.120
The extent to which corporate arrangements have effects on third parties
depends on which third parties are included in the frame of evaluation. The SEC
could evaluate corporate regulations on three successively broader criteria,121 each

116

Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst, supra note 16, at 101.
See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 887, 891,
896–99 (2002).
118 See Lucian Bebchuk, Scott Hirst & June Rhee, Towards the Declassification of S&P 500 Boards,
3 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 157, 163 (2013).
119 See id. at 172.
120 A similar argument applies to interpretation of these arrangements by the courts. See Klausner,
supra note 56, at 762–63.
121 For a discussion of the criteria for SEC rule making, see Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, The Efficiency
Criterion for Securities Regulation: Investor Welfare or Total Surplus?, 57 Ariz. L. Rev. 85, 89–90
(2015) and Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, SEC Rules, Stakeholder Interests, and Cost-benefit Analysis, 10 Cap.
Mkts. L.J. 311, 313 (2015), which differentiate between the impact of using investor benefit or
social welfare criteria.
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of which contemplates effects on successively broader groups of third parties that
might suffer externalities from corporate arrangements.122
First, the SEC’s investor protection criterion incorporates externalities on
investors in other corporations and future investors in corporations. As discussed
in Part I.B, diversified investors will internalize the benefits to other corporations
that they also invest in. While most investment funds are broadly diversified, not
all of them hold interests in all corporations.123 However, the effect that a
corporation switching its arrangements has on other corporations is likely to be
similar for many other corporations, so it will not matter that the investment funds
do not have interests in all of those companies.124 The effect on the switching
corporation is also likely to be much greater than the effect of the switch on any
other individual corporation. As a result, any potential effect of the switch to other
corporations that diversified investment managers do not hold will be very minor
in comparison to the effect on the switching corporation.
It is also possible to conceive of potential externalities to future investors:
either investors in the switching corporation or investors in other corporations.
Such externalities could eventuate if switching arrangements move significant
costs or benefits from the present to the future, or vice versa. However,
institutional investors will again internalize these effects for similar reasons. The
same institutional investors are likely to constitute the great majority of future
investors, as they do in the present.125 The interests of other future investors are
likely to be correlated with those of institutional investors.
Second, when efficiency, competition, and capital formation are also
considered, there may be externalities on other capital market participants such as
financial institutions, broker-dealers, and securities exchanges. However, other
market participants that have costs and benefits from the arrangement will pass on
much of those effects to corporations, and therefore to investors. This will include
institutional investors, who will therefore internalize those effects. In addition,
most financial institutions and many other market participants are public
corporations themselves, so diversified investors are likely to hold investments in
them directly and will internalize any costs and benefits they face.
122 Prior literature has divided the potential effects into capital markets effects and real effects.
See, e.g., Christian Leuz & Peter D. Wysocki, The Economics of Disclosure and Financial Reporting
Regulation: Evidence and Suggestions for Future Research, 54 J. Acct. Res. 525, 545 (2016).
Collectively these cover the same effects as those in the first and second groups discussed here.
123 Index funds that track broad indexes such as the Russell 3000 and the CRSP U.S. Total Market
Index will have similarly broad holdings; the latter claims to include “nearly 100% of the U.S.
investable equity market . . . .” CRSP U.S. Total Market Index, Ctr. for Research in Sec.
Prices, http://www.crsp.com/products/investment-products/crsp-us-total-market-index.
124 Described formally, externality effects would need to be negatively correlated with the costs
and benefits to other corporations and of a similar order of magnitude.
125 Index funds will remain in the corporation as future investors for as long as the corporation
remains part of the index. Many actively managed funds are “closet indexers,” and generally follow
the index weighting of many corporations, with some deviations. See Cremers & Petajisto, supra note
115, at 3332.
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Finally, the SEC may consider the social welfare effects of a corporate
arrangement.126 Some corporate arrangements could have social benefits but
impose costs on the business operations of corporations, or vice versa. Most of
these kinds of arrangements—such as environmental regulations or workplace
regulations—are not within the purview of the SEC. However, a small number of
arrangements governed by the SEC do fall into this category. For example, the
SEC’s Conflict Minerals Rule had implementation costs for corporations, but
those costs were justified on the grounds that the rule would “promote peace and
security in the [Democratic Republic of the Congo].”127
Non-capital market social welfare effects are not likely to be internalized by
institutional investors.128 If these effects are likely to outweigh the effects of the
arrangement on capital markets, then a mandatory rule could be superior to an
investor ordered rule. Whether this is likely to be the case will be for the SEC to
determine when deciding whether an arrangement should be mandatory or
investor ordered. However, SEC regulations that benefit society at the cost of
investors and capital markets are rare. Such rules are likely to fail the statutory
requirement that they “promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation
criteria.”129 Where such regulations have been promulgated by the SEC, it has
generally been because of a congressional mandate to do so, as was the case with
the SEC’s Conflict Minerals Rule.130 If the SEC were to implement such a rule
without an explicit congressional mandate, the requirement to “promote
efficiency, competition, and capital formation” could lead the rule to be invalidated
by the D.C. Circuit.131
A final point to note regarding potential externalities is that, compared to
mandatory regulations, investor ordered regulations may also produce positive
externalities.132 Investor ordering may produce information that can be inferred
from the initiation decisions of investors and managers133 and from the approval
126

The purpose of the Securities Exchange Act extends beyond investor protection to the public
interest. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012) (enumerating the national
public interest in regulating securities exchanges).
127 Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,273, 56,276 (Sept. 12, 2012); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v.
SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 365 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (discussing the SEC’s consideration of the “compelling
social benefits” the rule was supposed to achieve), overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep't
Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
128 Institutional investors could also take into account broader social concerns that would also
apply to internalize the effects of corporate arrangements on other parts of society. See Hirst, supra
note 11.
129 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2012); see discussion infra Part III.A.1.
130 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p). The validity of such mandates is discussed in Part V.C.
131 Cf. Bus. Roundtable II at 1148.
132 Both investor ordered regulations and mandatory regulations may create observable
information in the decisions of investors and managers regarding lobbying regulators over the content
of the rule.
133 Information about managers that can be inferred by their investment decisions may also be of
value to investors in the corporation. However, this would be a direct benefit of the rule and not an
externality.
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decisions of investors.134 For instance, if investors approve a switch to a particular
arrangement, observers of the corporation can infer that investors believe the
arrangement to be optimal for the corporation. This might allow observers to make
additional inferences about the corporation that may have social benefit. For
instance, investors in other corporations that they know to be similar will derive
information about whether the arrangement is likely to be beneficial for their
corporation. These benefits should also be taken into account in considering
whether to adopt investor ordering.
5. High Switching Costs, Limiting Optimal Switches
If an investor ordered rule implemented a default that was more costly than the
default that would be used for a mandatory rule, and corporations did not switch
arrangements because of high switching costs, the investor ordered rule could be
inferior to a mandatory rule. However, switching costs are likely to be very low for
new arrangements.135 For such arrangements, the main switching cost will be the
cost of having a shareholder vote on switching arrangements. Corporations are
required to conduct shareholder meetings annually. These meetings require
considerable disclosure136 and include numerous other proposals for investors to
consider and vote on. To describe and consider one additional proposal that
requires several pages of additional disclosure is likely to involve a very small
increase in cost.
6. Duplicative Decision Costs that Outweigh the Benefits of Investor Ordering
Finally, investor ordering could be inferior to mandatory ordering if the
aggregate costs of corporations switching arrangements are greater than the cost of
implementing a mandatory rule, and that difference exceeds the benefit from
investor ordering. This is the converse of the economies of scale justification for
mandatory rules discussed in Part I.A.3. Introducing the possibility of switching
means that each corporation will bear some decision costs in determining whether
to initiate arrangement switching. Where switching is initiated, investors will incur
additional decision costs in determining whether to approve the switch.137 Decision
costs are prior to the switching costs considered in Part II.B.1, and occur
irrespective of whether the corporation actually switches arrangements.
134

See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 97 (1989) (discussing information production as a rationale for
“penalty default rules”).
135 The potential switching costs associated with deregulation—moving from an existing
arrangement to a new arrangement—may be higher, as discussed in Part V.B.
136 For instance, the 2012 proxy statement of McDonald’s Corporation had 88 pages (including
exhibits), of which two management proposals to amend corporate arrangements took up
approximately half a page each. McDonald’s Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 36–
37 (Apr. 13, 2012).
137 Decision costs may be lessened by managers not initiating switching decisions that they expect
would have a significant chance of approval by investors, since putting forward such switches may
not reflect well on the manager. This is similar to the reticence of managers to put forward charter
amendments that they believe are unlikely to pass. See, e.g., Hirst, supra note 86.
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Of course, mandatory rules also involve decision costs. The regulator will bear
decision costs in choosing an arrangement. Those costs have economies of scale
because the regulator makes one rule for all corporations. However, groups of
managers and investors will also incur decision costs in informing themselves
whether a proposed mandatory arrangement is in their interests and lobbying the
regulator to implement their preferred arrangement. After a mandatory rule is
implemented, these groups may also incur decision costs lobbying the regulator to
change the rule to their preferred arrangement.
There are reasons to believe that the decision costs for corporations and
investors will not be significant. Switching decisions in different corporations will
be similar, especially for corporations that are similar in aspects relevant to the
arrangement. The basis for managers’ decisions to initiate switching will be
publicly disseminated to investors and can also be used by other corporations and
investors making switching decisions. Institutional investors will learn from
successive switching decisions in the many corporations in which they invest,
reducing their marginal information cost for each decision. These costs will be
further reduced by proxy advisors that evaluate the costs and benefits of switching
and share the cost of doing so among many investors. The SEC can also decrease
decision costs by producing information relevant to the switching decision as part
of its economic analysis.138 Finally, if investors believe that decision costs are likely
to outweigh the benefits of switching, investors could curtail future switching
decisions, for instance, by adopting a charter or bylaw amendment that imposes
very stringent requirements for switching.
* * *
Given these potential limitations of the case against investor ordering, it will
fall to the SEC to determine the validity of the assumptions regarding institutional
investors having a veto and the lack of externalities.139 In addition to undertaking
cost-benefit analysis regarding whether to implement or change a regulation, the
SEC must also analyze whether an investor ordered rule is superior to a mandatory
rule. This analysis is considered in greater depth in Part III.
III. The Cost-Benefit Analysis Case for Investor Ordering
Part II examined the first-order case for investor ordering: in normal
conditions, it results in at least the same and often greater aggregate net benefits to
investors than do mandatory rules. Parts III and IV consider two second-order
cases for investor ordering that follow from the investor value case. This Part
138

See infra Part V.A.6.
Where the SEC is less certain about the existence of externalities, the expected value of those
externalities will be lower, and investor ordered rules will be more likely to have greater aggregate net
benefits than mandatory rules.
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considers the cost-benefit analysis case for investor ordering, while Part IV
considers the retrospective analysis case for investor ordering.
Cost-benefit analysis has long been a part of the regulatory process for
executive agencies, including the SEC.140 Recent judicial decisions have applied
requirements for cost-benefit analysis to corporate regulations promulgated by the
SEC. Section A describes cost-benefit analysis as applied to corporate regulations,
its effects on corporate regulation, and the arguments concerning whether costbenefit analysis should or should not apply to corporate regulations.
Given the investor value case for investor ordering, cost-benefit analysis has
two significant implications. First, as section C explains, the D.C. Circuit’s
jurisprudence is likely to require the SEC to consider investor ordering as an
alternative to a mandatory rule. In the majority of cases where investor ordering
results in greater aggregate net benefit, it would be arbitrary and capricious for the
SEC to instead implement a mandatory rule.
Second, section C explains that investor ordering reduces the cost of costbenefit analysis for corporate regulation. Investor ordering imposes a lower bound
on the potential cost of a regulation for a corporation, substantially simplifying the
process of determining the cost of corporate regulations. Compared to mandatory
regulations, investor ordered regulations can therefore be implemented at a lower
cost to the SEC.
A. Cost-Benefit Analysis of Corporate Regulation
1. The Requirements for Cost-Benefit Analysis
The SEC’s obligation to undertake cost-benefit analysis derives from four
sources.141 First, the Regulatory Flexibility Act142 (RFA) requires agencies,
including the SEC, to publish a “regulatory flexibility analysis”—essentially a
cost-benefit analysis describing the impact of any proposed or final regulation on
small entities.143 Second, the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) requires agencies to
conduct and submit to the Office of Management and Budget a review of
collections of information under the regulation, which involves a de facto cost-
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See, e.g., Bruce Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for SEC Cost-Benefit Analysis, 30
Yale J. Reg. 289, 296 (2013) (dating voluntary SEC cost-benefit analysis from the 1970s); see also
Joshua T. White, The Evolving Role of Economic Analysis in SEC Rulemaking, 50 Ga. L. Rev. 293,
301 (2015).
141 Although none of these requirements explicitly require the SEC to conduct a comprehensive
cost-benefit analysis, the SEC’s practice for many years has been to conduct such analyses. See, e.g.,
SEC Office of Inspector Gen., Follow-Up Review of Cost-Benefit Analyses
in Selected SEC Dodd-Frank Act Rulemakings 6 (2012) (“SEC Chairmen have made
a commitment to Congress that the SEC will conduct cost-benefit or economic analyses in connection
with its rulemaking activities.”).
142 Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2012).
143 Id. §§ 603–604.
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benefit analysis.144 Third, although the SEC is an independent agency145 and
therefore not subject to the series of Executive Orders requiring cost-benefit
analyses,146 Executive Order 13,579 recommends that independent agencies
undertake cost-benefit analyses.147 However, the most important factor of the
SEC’s cost-benefit analysis is the D.C. Circuit’s judicial review of SEC regulation
to ensure it complies with the Administrative Procedure Act and the requirements
in the SEC’s authorizing legislation.148
The Administrative Procedure Act contains several requirements for rule
making by agencies. The agency must give public notice of proposed regulations or
amendments,149 including a statement of the rationale for the change and a request
for comment.150 The agency must then consider the matter and any comments.
Finally, the agency must publish a statement of the basis and purpose for the rule
before it can become effective.151
The Administrative Procedure Act also makes SEC regulations subject to
judicial review.152 As well as being reviewable for exceeding statutory authority,153
SEC regulations can be set aside if they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”154 Persons aggrieved by most
144

Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3506–3507 (2012).
Rather than being an executive agency headed by a cabinet member, the SEC is headed by a
commission of five, with no more than three members from any party. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a).
146 See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (2011), in which President Obama reaffirmed
and expanded upon President Clinton’s Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (1993), which in
turn had reaffirmed President Reagan’s Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (1981).
147
See Exec. Order No. 13,579, 76 Fed. Reg. 41585, 41587 (2011) (“To the extent permitted by
law, independent regulatory agencies should comply with [the cost-benefit analysis] provisions as
well.”).
148 In addition to judicial review, SEC rules that have been in place for 60 days or less are also
subject to congressional review. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 801 (2012). In
February 2017, Congress used this rule to prevent the SEC’s Conflict Minerals Rule from coming
into effect. See Pub. L. No. 115-4 (2017).
149 The rules considered here are “legislative rules,” through which the agency “intends to create
a new law, rights or duties.” Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(en banc). Legislative rules are those issued through the notice-and-comment process, as opposed to
“interpretative rules.” See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012).
150 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018).
151 Id. § 553.
152 See id. § 704 (“[F]inal agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are
subject to judicial review.”). As an independent agency, the SEC is not exempt from judicial review
as executive agencies would be. See Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3502(2) (2012). For a
discussion of the implications of the differing application of judicial review to federal agencies, see
Robert P. Bartlett, The Institutional Framework for Cost-Benefit Analysis in Financial Regulation: A Tale
of Four Paradigms?, 43 J. Legal Stud. S379, S381 (2014).
153 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2018) (agency action is unlawful if “in
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right”). Cf. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1983) (with differing results).
154 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2018). See also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844
(“such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute”) (footnote omitted); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1982) (explaining that “arbitrary and capricious” includes
145
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SEC rules can seek review in the D.C. Circuit,155 which has become a “de facto,
quasi-specialized administrative law court of last resort.”156
The D.C. Circuit has generally not looked favorably on SEC regulations.157
From 1990 to 2011, the D.C. Circuit reviewed seven SEC rules, and invalidated or
remanded each one.158 Most of these rules were found not to be authorized by
statute.159 However, in the three cases where the rule was authorized, the D.C.
Circuit reviewed the SEC’s rule making record. These cases have a particular
bearing on cost-benefit analysis by the SEC.160
In each case, the D.C. Circuit found that the SEC regulation failed the
“arbitrary or capricious” test because the SEC improperly or insufficiently
considered “whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation” as required by the SEC’s authorizing statutes.161 In Business Roundtable
situations where “the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision
that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed
to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise”).
155 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78y(b)(1) (2012). For rules authorized by
other parts of the Exchange Act, U.S. district courts have jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
156 Christopher P. Banks, Judicial Politics in the D.C. Circuit Court xiii
(1999) (explaining that the Supreme Court rarely grants certiorari for review of D.C. Circuit decisions
reviewing agency rule making).
157 Richard L. Revesz, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Structure of the Administrative State: The Case
of Financial Services Regulation, 34 Yale J. Reg. 19 (forthcoming 2017) (“Since the early 1990s, the
D.C. Circuit has treated SEC regulations with skepticism, particularly in connection with the
Commission’s cost-benefit analyses.”).
158 See Bus. Roundtable II; Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(finding the SEC’s consideration of the effect of a rule excluding fixed-indexed annuities from the
Securities Act was arbitrary and capricious); Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (finding the Investment Advisers Act unambiguous in not authorizing rules exempting brokerdealers from the Act); U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
[hereinafter Chamber of Commerce II] (finding that the SEC had failed to follow the notice-andcomment procedure with respect to information on which it substantially relied); Chamber of
Commerce I; Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Bus. Roundtable I]
(finding that the Securities Exchange Act did not authorize the SEC to bar self-regulatory
organizations from listing dual-class stock). See also Leen Al-Alami, Business Roundtable v. SEC:
Rising Judicial Mistrust and the Onset of a New Era in Judicial Review of Securities Regulation Comment,
15 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 541 (2013) (summarizing these cases).
159 Fin. Planning Ass’n, 482 F.3d 481; Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Teicher
v. SEC, 177 F.3d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Bus. Roundtable I. In Chamber of Commerce II, 443 F.3d 890,
the SEC rule was found to be authorized but was invalidated because the SEC.
160 Bus. Roundtable II; Am. Equity, 613 F.3d 166; Chamber of Commerce II, 443 F.3d 890. In two
further cases during this period, the D.C. Circuit remanded SEC orders on the grounds that they
were not adequately supported by the SEC’s analysis. See NetCoalition v. SEC, 615 F.3d 525 (D.C.
Cir. 2010) (remanding an SEC order approving a fee charged by an exchange for its depth-of-order
book, on the grounds that the SEC did not explain or support its conclusion); Timpinaro v. SEC, 2
F.3d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (remanding an SEC rule prohibiting professional traders from making
automated trades on the grounds that the SEC had not adequately substantiated that the costs of the
order outweighed the benefits).
161 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2012). These provisions were inserted by
the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified in scattered
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II, the high-water mark of the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of these requirements,
the court found that the SEC’s failure to “determine the likely economic
consequences of [the SEC’s proposed proxy access rule] and to connect those
consequences to efficiency, competition, and capital formation” made the rule
arbitrary and capricious.162 The court effectively faulted the SEC’s cost-benefit
analysis as insufficient, concluding that the SEC had:
inconsistently and opportunistically framed the
costs and benefits of the rule; failed adequately to
quantify the certain costs or to explain why those
costs could not be quantified; neglected to
support its predictive judgments; contradicted
itself; and failed to respond to substantial
problems raised by commenters.163
The D.C. Circuit’s subsequent decision in National Association of
Manufacturers164 was more favorable to the SEC, with the court refusing to
invalidate SEC rules implementing Dodd-Frank’s mandate of conflict mineral
disclosure on the grounds that they were arbitrary or capricious.165 However, the
decision did not ameliorate the implicit requirements contained in Business
Roundtable II for the SEC to undertake rigorous conduct cost-benefit analysis.166

sections of 15 U.S.C.), although Section 23(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act also requires the
SEC to consider the impact that the regulation would have on competition. See Securities Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78w.
162 Bus. Roundtable II at 1148.
163 Id. at 1149–50. In addition, the court found that the application of the rule to investment
companies was also arbitrary. See id. at 1150. Because of these conclusions, the court did not address
the plaintiffs’ argument that the rule arbitrarily rejected proposed alternatives “that would have
allowed shareholders of each company to decide for that company whether to adopt a mechanism for
shareholders’ nominees to get access to proxy materials.” Id.
164 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
165 See id. at 369. The court did invalidate part of the rules on First Amendment grounds. See id.
at 373.
166 The decision noted that the SEC “exhaustively analyzed the final rule’s costs.” Id. at 369. The
court therefore did not have reason to consider whether the requirements for cost-benefit analysis in
Business Roundtable II were appropriate. The decision also noted that, because of the requirements of
the statute, the SEC “had to promulgate a disclosure rule” and was entitled to rely on Congress’s
conclusions regarding the benefits of the rule. Id. at 370.
An alternative explanation for the decision may be the change in the political composition of court.
Through 2011, a majority of the D.C. Circuit judges had been appointed by Republican presidents,
with Judge Douglas Ginsburg, who was appointed by President Reagan, authoring many of the
important decisions invalidating SEC rules. However, in 2011, President Obama appointed a number
of judges to fill the seats of Judge Ginsburg and others who had taken senior status, leading to a shift
to a majority of Democrat-appointed judges. The National Association of Manufacturers panel also
contained a majority of Democrat-appointed judges.
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The Business Roundtable II decision has been roundly criticized167 and has
ignited a voluminous debate regarding the costs and benefits of cost-benefit
analysis for financial and corporate regulation in particular.168 The next section
briefly surveys this debate and draws conclusions for investor ordering in corporate
regulation.
2. The Debate About Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation
The debate about cost-benefit analysis of financial regulation is a chapter in an
older and more general debate about the value of cost-benefit analysis.169
Proponents of cost-benefit analysis argue that it is necessary to determine the social
welfare effects of regulation, and that it creates greater transparency about the
reasoning underlying rules, making regulators more accountable for their decisions
and improving their performance.
With respect to financial regulation, critics have argued that quantitative costbenefit analysis is not feasible—either not possible at all,170 or so unreliable or costly
that it fails its own cost-benefit criterion.171 These arguments have been bolstered
by case-studies demonstrating the shortcomings of past quantitative analyses.172
Critics generally conclude that requirements for cost-benefit analysis should not
extend beyond qualitative analyses.

167

E.g., James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the D.C.
Circuit’s Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 Tex. L. Rev. 1811, 1813 (2012); Jill E. Fisch,
The Long Road Back: Business Roundtable and the Future of SEC Rulemaking, 36 Seattle U. L. Rev.
695, 697–98 (2013); Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Bizarre Law and Economics of
Business Roundtable v. SEC, 38 J. Corp. L. 101, 102 (2012); Coates, supra note 36, at 917–19; Jeffrey
N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial Regulation, 43 J. Legal Stud.
S351, S370 (2014).
168 Financial regulation also includes many other regulated entities, such as financial institutions,
broker-dealers and other market participants. However, given that the cases on the subject related to
corporate regulations requiring proxy access and disclosure of conflict minerals, much of the recent
debate over cost-benefit analysis in financial regulation has related to corporate regulations.
169 For a summary of this debate, see Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling,
Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing
(2004).
170 Gordon, supra note 167, at S352.
171 Coates, supra note 36, at 999; John H. Cochrane, Challenges for Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Financial Regulation, 43 J. Legal Stud. S63, S100 (2014).
172 Howell E. Jackson & Paul Rothstein, The Analysis of Benefits in Consumer Protection
Regulations
(2015)
(unpublished
paper),
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/jackson_and_rothstein_article-_december_2015.pdf
(considering consumer finance rules); Jeff Schwartz & Alexandrea Nelson, Cost-Benefit Analysis and
the Conflict Minerals Rule, 68 Admin. L. Rev. (2016); Edward Sherwin, The Cost-Benefit Analysis

of Financial Regulation: Lessons from the SEC’s Stalled Mutual Fund Reform Effort, 12 Stan.
J.L. Bus. & Fin. 1 (2006); Joshua T. White, Quantified Cost-Benefit Analysis at the SEC, 2
Admin. L. Rev. Accord 53 (2016) (considering conflict minerals disclosure); White, supra note
140 (considering credit risk retention); see also Coates, supra note 36 (considering mutual fund
reforms). Professor Coates also considered Sarbanes-Oxley, Basel III, the Volcker Rule, cross-border
swaps, and mortgage reforms.
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Defenders of cost-benefit analysis of corporate regulations counter that
quantitative analysis is possible and valuable for financial regulations, even though
its results include some uncertainty,173 and that quantitative analysis of financial
regulation is not so different from the application of cost-benefit analysis in other
areas.174 To the extent there have been shortcomings in recent analyses, defenders
argue, these could be overcome by improving the capacity of the institutions
undertaking cost-benefit analysis,175 a process which is already underway.176
A further strand in the debate relates to whether or not judicial review of costbenefit analysis is optimal.177 Critics of judicial review claim that it gives agencies
incentives to undertake cost-benefit analyses that are overly conservative and that
camouflage uncertainties.178 One solution would be to replace judicial review with
review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), part of the
Office of Management and Budget.179 However, OIRA review of SEC rule making
faces practical difficulties,180 and replacing courts as reviewing bodies may not be
possible,181 at least not without congressional action,182 suggesting that OIRA
review should instead complement judicial review.183
As it stands, the debate offers no clear conclusions about whether quantitative
cost-benefit analysis of financial regulation is worthwhile, whether it is even
possible, or how it could be improved. Policy makers have yet to follow the
recommendations of those criticizing cost-benefit analysis, and have instead
engrained cost-benefit analysis further into the regulatory process.
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See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial Regulation, 43 J.
Legal Stud. S1, S16 (2014) (responding to the criticisms put forward by Professor Coates).
174 See Revesz, supra note 157, at 14 (comparing cost-benefit analysis by financial regulators to the
Environmental Protection Agency); Cass R. Sunstein, Financial Regulation and Cost-Benefit Analysis,
124 Yale L. J. F. 263, 270 (2015) (arguing that shortcomings in cost-benefit analysis of financial
regulation can be overcome by break-even analysis).
175 See Revesz, supra note 157, at 44.
176 See Kraus & Raso, supra note 140, at 325; Bruce R. Kraus, Economists in the Room at the SEC,
124 Yale L. J. F. 280, 296 (2015).
177 See Bartlett, supra note 152, at S400; Coates, supra note 36, at 912 (criticizing judicial review);
Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Comment: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Courts, 78 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 55, 63 (2015) (suggesting limitations on judicial review); Posner & Weyl, supra note 173, at
S30 (considering executive review in lieu of judicial review); Sunstein, supra note 174, at 267.
178 See Coates, supra note 36, at 902; Schwartz & Nelson, supra note 172, at 6.
179 See Bartlett, supra note 152, at S400; Ryan Bubb, Comment: The OIRA Model for
Institutionalizing CBA of Financial Regulation, 78 Law & Contemp. Probs. 47, 51 (2015). For a
discussion and history of OIRA, see Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of
the Regulatory State, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1260 (2006).
180 See Kraus & Raso, supra note 140, at 336 (arguing that OIRA would not be effective for
overseeing independent agencies given their multi-member constitution). But see Revesz, supra note
157, at 40 (arguing that judicial review of independent agencies suffers from the same problem).
181 See Revesz, supra note 157, at 47.
182 See Jackson, supra note 177, at 63.
183 See, e.g., Revesz, supra note 157, at 49 (arguing that courts should give greater deference to rule
making that had been reviewed by OIRA).
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3. The Future of Cost-Benefit Analysis
Indeed, recent judicial and congressional developments suggest that costbenefit analysis will likely become more important. The U.S. Supreme Court’s
2015 decision in Michigan v. Environmental Protection Agency will likely further
enshrine the importance of cost-benefit analysis for SEC rules.184 Justice Scalia’s
opinion reads the term “appropriate and necessary” as requiring analysis of the
costs of an environmental protection regulation.185 As Professor Revesz has
pointed out, this term appears frequently in the SEC’s organic statutes.186 The
Financial CHOICE Act bill approved by the House of Representatives includes
stringent requirements for rule making by financial agencies, including
requirements for quantitative cost-benefit analysis, and judicial and congressional
review of regulatory actions.187
B. The Implications of Cost-Benefit Analysis for Investor Ordering
The first-order benefits of investor ordering described in Part II will almost
certainly require that the SEC consider investor ordering for corporate regulations
as part of its cost-benefit analysis, and may require investor ordering for corporate
regulations.
The SEC is required to consider reasonable alternatives to its proposed
regulation.188 That investor ordering will, in most cases, result in the same or
greater aggregate net benefit as a mandatory rule suggests that it represents a
reasonable alternative.189 In addition, the SEC is also obligated to consider investor
protection, and the effects of the rules on efficiency, competition, and capital
formation,190 which the D.C. Circuit has interpreted to include the cost of
regulations. As discussed in Part II.B, investor ordering is likely to reduce the cost
of regulations, and thereby affect efficiency, competition, and capital formation.
The SEC will therefore be required to consider investor ordering as an alternative
to a mandatory rule, and failure to do so is likely to provide grounds for invalidating
the regulation as arbitrary and capricious.
184

135 U.S. 2699 (2015).
See id. at 2711.
186 Revesz, supra note 157, at 4.
187 Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. § 312 (2017). Many of these provisions
were derived from previously bills, including Financial Regulatory Responsibility Act of 2011, S. 1615,
112th Cong. (2011); SEC Regulatory Accountability Act of 2011, H.R. 2308 112th Cong. (2011); and
Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act of 2012, S. 3468 112th Cong. (2012). Although these
bills have not yet been enacted, they demonstrate the legislative aspirations of a powerful group of
law makers.
188 See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce I (“The disclosure alternative was neither frivolous nor out of
bounds and the Commission therefore had an obligation to consider it.”) (quoting Laclede Gas Co.
v. FERC, 873 F.2d 1494, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1989). See also Fisch, supra note 167, at 717.
189 Investor ordering could also be raised as an alternative in comment letters responding to the
proposal, strengthening the obligation for the SEC to consider it. See Laclede Gas Co., 873 F.2d at
1498 (requiring FERC to consider reasonable alternatives suggested in comment letters).
190 See Bus. Roundtable II at 1148.
185
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Given the investor value case for investor ordering, investor ordering will
produce greater aggregate net benefits than a mandatory rule for rules that do not
involve significant potential externalities that institutional investors would not
internalize, and for corporations where institutional investors exercise power over
the choice of arrangements. If the SEC’s economic analysis does not demonstrate
substantial evidence that these limitations apply, then investor ordering is likely to
result in greater aggregate net benefits than a mandatory rule. Implementing a
mandatory rule where it would be inferior to a reasonable alternative is therefore
likely to be arbitrary and capricious, rendering the regulation susceptible to
invalidation by the D.C. Circuit.191
This discussion suggests that the burden of the SEC’s cost-benefit analysis
should shift to concluding whether there are clear reasons why investor ordering
would not produce greater aggregate net benefits than a mandatory regulation. In
the absence of such a finding, the SEC should implement its regulations using
investor ordering.
C. The Advantage of Investor Ordering for Cost-Benefit Analysis
The major second-order benefit of investor ordering is that it significantly
reduces the substantial cost of cost-benefit analysis and, consequently, the cost of
making regulations, or amending or repealing them.
1. The Cost of Cost-Benefit Analysis
The effect of requiring cost-benefit analysis has been to substantially increase
the cost of the SEC’s rule making process.192 The decision in Business Roundtable
II and the threat of judicial review invalidating future rules have caused the SEC to
increase the resources it devotes to cost-benefit analysis. If the requirements for
cost-benefit analysis become more stringent these costs may increase further.
Even prior to the Business Roundtable II decision, the SEC devoted substantial
resources to cost-benefit analysis. The SEC estimated that preparation and analysis
of the proxy access rule that was the subject of the Business Roundtable II litigation
required at least 22,000 staff hours over two years, at an approximate cost of $2.2
million.193 By comparison, the entire 2010 budget of the SEC Division of Risk,
191 Note that the Financial CHOICE Act would generally prohibit rule making if the SEC
concluded that the quantified costs are greater than the quantified benefits. See H.R. 10, 115th Cong.
§ 312(b)(4)(A) (2017).
192 Donna M. Nagy, The Costs of Mandatory Cost-Benefit Analysis in SEC Rulemaking, 57 Ariz. L.
Rev. 129, 149 (2015) (describing the different types of costs of cost-benefit analysis); see also White,
supra note 140, at 309 (quantifying the costs of the SEC’s economics division).
193 Letter from Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, to Scott Garrett, Representative, U.S. House
of Representatives (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.law.du.edu/documents/corporate-governance/secand-governance/SEC-letter%208-5-11.pdf; see also Robert B. Ahdieh, Reanalyzing Cost-Benefit
Analysis: Toward a Framework of Function(s) and Form(s), 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1983, 1988 (2013);
Rachel A. Benedict, Judicial Review of SEC Rules: Managing the Costs of Cost-Benefit Analysis
Note, 97 Minn. L. Rev. 278, 278 (2012); Anthony W. Mongone, Business Roundtable: A New Level
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Strategy and Financial Innovation, which was then responsible for economic
analysis, was $20 million.194
Since the Business Roundtable II decision, the costs of cost-benefit analysis have
increased substantially. Following the decision, the SEC undertook a
comprehensive review of its economic analyses.195 The result was a memorandum
setting out new guidelines for SEC economic analysis.196 The memorandum
adopted many of OIRA’s approaches to cost-benefit analysis.197 To increase its
capacity to undertake the more rigorous economic analysis described in the
memorandum, the SEC undertook substantial internal reorganization and an
expansion of the department responsible for these analyses.198 The Division of
Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation was reconstituted as the Department of
Economic and Risk Analysis (DERA). DERA has since hired a substantial number
of economists,199 and SEC budget requests for DERA have grown significantly
more than any other SEC department.200 The increased resources devoted to
economic analysis can be expected to have increased the detail that has gone into
SEC proposed rules and regulations.
The costs of SEC rule making include not just direct costs, but the expected
costs of future litigation. To the extent that Business Roundtable II has increased the
likelihood of challenges to rule making, the expected cost of litigation has also risen.
These costs present a substantial impediment to rule making. SEC rule
changes can be considered as a tradeoff between increasing investor protection and
increasing the ease of capital formation. Higher costs for rule changes mean that
the SEC can do less of either for the same cost. The SEC can make either fewer
rule changes for the same cost, or the same number of rule changes for greater cost.
If the SEC’s budget remains fixed, or grows less than commensurate to the costs
of rule making, this will reduce the SEC’s ability to undertake rule making. While
this may be seen as a benefit by those who believe SEC regulations to be
undesirable, it will also limit the SEC’s ability to deregulate. Investor ordering
provides a solution to these problems.

of Judicial Scrutiny and Its Implications in a Post-Dodd-Frank World Note, 2012 Colum. Bus. L.
Rev. 746, 794 (2012); Nagy, supra note 192, at 131.
194 SEC, In Brief: FY 2012 Congressional Justification (2011). Of course, a
substantial proportion of the costs involved in the preparation of the proxy access release derived
from other SEC departments, including the Division of Corporate Finance and the Office of the
General Counsel.
195 This was prompted in part by a review by the SEC’s Office of the Inspector General. SEC
Office of Inspector Gen., supra note 141.
196 SEC, Current Guidance on Economic Analysis in SEC Rulemaking
(2012).
197 Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,366 (Oct. 9, 2003).
198 Kraus & Raso, supra note 140, at 326; White, supra note 140, at 307.
199 Kraus & Raso, supra note 140, at 326; White, supra note 140, at 307.
200 White, supra note 140, at 309.
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2. Investor Ordering and Cost-Benefit Analysis
As illustrated in Part II, in most conditions, investor ordered rules will provide
greater aggregate net benefit because they cap the cost of a regulation for particular
corporations at the cost of switching arrangements. The maximum aggregate cost
of the regulation can be calculated as the sum of the switching costs for those
corporations where investors are likely to switch arrangements. This means that
cost-benefit analysis of investor ordered regulations is considerably simpler than
that of mandatory regulations. Rather than estimating the exact cost to
corporations of the regulation, the SEC can instead calculate the maximum cost to
corporations of opting-out of the regulation.
Under the system of investor ordering described in Part II.A, the main
switching cost for a new corporate regulation will be the cost of putting forward
switching proposals for approval at annual meetings and of shareholders deciding
whether to approve those proposals. The costs associated with shareholder voting
on proposals at annual meetings are familiar to the SEC from its long experience
with proxy rules and the hundreds of thousands of annual meetings that have been
conducted subject to those rules.
This process, and therefore the cost of switching associated with it, is unlikely
to vary significantly across corporations or across different corporate regulations.
This means that the analysis of opt-out costs could essentially be replicated and
refined from regulation to regulation. Once corporations had considered switching
from the initial investor ordered regulation, the costs of such switching would be a
strong estimator of the cost of switching from subsequent investor ordered
regulations. As further investor ordered regulations were implemented, the cost of
switching could be established with considerable accuracy. That is, the marginal
cost to the SEC of establishing the cost of successive regulations would approach
zero as the number of investor ordered regulations increased. Over time, costbenefit analysis of investor ordered regulations would evolve into a consideration
of the benefits of the regulation.201
Simplifying the SEC’s analysis of the costs of a regulation significantly reduces
the greatest burden on the SEC in cost-benefit analysis and one of the major vectors
of attacks against SEC regulations. The costs of a regulation are generally more
identifiable than benefits likely to result from the regulation. The RFA and the PRA
include explicit requirements that the SEC consider the costs of regulations.202 The
SEC therefore undertakes exhaustive consideration of the potential costs of a

201 The effect of this approach would be particularly pronounced for negative aggregate net benefit
arrangements. If investor ordered, such arrangements would be of positive net aggregate benefit even
if they only benefit a small number of corporations. For these rules, the SEC would only need to show
that the rule is likely to be substantially beneficial for investors in a small number of corporations.
202 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 603–604 (2012); Paperwork Reduction Act, 44
U.S.C. §§ 3506-3507.
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regulation, which comprise a significant proportion of the cost-benefit analyses
undertaken by the SEC.203
No matter how comprehensive the SEC’s analysis of costs, there will always
be some potential costs that the SEC fails to include. Plaintiffs wishing to challenge
SEC rules bear the burden of showing that the SEC has failed to consider certain
factors. It may often be easier for plaintiffs to identify additional costs that the SEC
has not considered than to suggest that the SEC has overstated the benefits of a
regulation. This is compounded by the fact that plaintiffs seeking to challenge SEC
regulations have generally represented corporate interests, which—given their
constituency—have informational advantages in identifying the costs to
corporations from the regulation. The plaintiffs in Business Roundtable II and
National Association of Manufacturers focused on the SEC’s failure to fully estimate
the potential costs of corporate regulations.204 The SEC’s focus on an exhaustive
discussion of costs has been in part an attempt to forestall future attacks on such
grounds. However, given the impossibility of identifying all such costs, a court
could still find this incomplete. In these circumstances, limiting the set of factors
involved in establishing the costs of the regulation is especially valuable.
Investor ordered regulations also provide a simpler framework for establishing
the benefits of a regulation. Rather than “guesstimating” the potential benefits of
the rule,205 the SEC can determine whether investors are likely to switch from the
default arrangement. That investors do not expect to switch is evidence that the
default arrangement is likely to be of aggregate net benefit to investors. Given the
realities of institutional investor ownership, whether corporations switch will be
determined by a relatively small number of institutional investors.206 It would be
inexpensive for the SEC to determine the beliefs of these investors regarding the
effects of the regulation on their portfolio companies. The SEC is already required
to solicit the views of market participants as part of the notice-and-comment
process, and many of these investors, or their representative organizations, submit
comments in response to proposed regulations.207 Alternatively, the SEC could
take a more proactive approach, surveying whether institutional investors favor the
203

For instance, in the SEC’s final Conflict Minerals Rule, the SEC’s economic analysis of the
potential benefits of the rule comprised of 836 words, while its discussions of the costs comprised
3,653 words. This is in addition to 6,643 words discussing comments related to costs of the rule,
compared to 1,048 words discussing comments relating to benefits of the rule. See Conflict Minerals,
77 Fed. Reg. 56,274 (Sept. 12, 2012).
204 See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Bus. Roundtable II at 1149.
205 See Coates, supra note 36, at 887.
206 See supra Part I.C.
207 For instance, on the SEC’s 2016 Universal Proxy proposal the SEC received comment letters
from the Investment Company Institute, representing investment managers, and the Council of
Institutional Investors, representing asset owners. Comments were also received from groups
generally representing corporate managers, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Business
Roundtable, the Society for Corporate Governance, and the National Association of Corporate
Directors. See Comments on Proposed Rule: Universal Proxies, SEC (Feb. 13, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-24-16/s72416.htm.

43

arrangement for particular types of portfolio companies.208 While switching
decisions will necessarily differ for each corporate regulation, the framework for
establishing investors’ views about the net benefits of an arrangement and their
likely switching behavior could be substantially reused from regulation to
regulation, reducing the cost of establishing the benefits of regulations.
Lower-cost cost-benefit analysis would have significant implications for SEC
rule making. The SEC could implement the same number of regulations at a lower
cost. Alternatively, working within a fixed budget, the SEC could implement more
regulations. This analysis also allows an end-run around the debate over costbenefit analysis of financial regulations. Implementing investor ordered rules
makes the stakes of that debate significantly lower without limiting the scope of
cost-benefit analysis.
IV. The Retrospective Analysis Case for Investor Ordering
The growth in emphasis on cost-benefit analysis of financial regulation has
been accompanied by a focus on retrospective analysis of regulations.
Retrospective analysis involves cost-benefit analysis of existing regulations. Where
regulations are found to be sub-optimal, retrospective analysis provides a basis for
their improvement, or—if they are not fixable—for their repeal. Executive Order
13,579 recommends greater retrospective review of SEC rule making.209
Retrospective analysis has been strongly advocated by certain commentators.210 As
a result, the SEC has undertaken retrospective analyses of many of its regulations.
The draft Financial CHOICE Act would mandate detailed retrospective analysis
of new and existing SEC regulations.211
Compared to mandatory regulations, investor ordering has four significant
benefits for retrospective analysis. As discussed in section A, the modification or
repeal of regulations is less necessary for investor ordered regulations, because
most corporations will opt out of value-decreasing arrangements. As section B
describes, whether corporations have switched arrangements provides an
automatic and timely measure of the value of the arrangement. Section C explains
that, to the extent it remains necessary, retrospective analysis is much easier and
less costly for investor ordered regulations because investor ordering permits
observation of variations in outcomes of different arrangements. Finally, section D
208 Some of these institutions may not respond to a survey if the SEC makes their responses public,
as has been the SEC’s practice for written comments it receives regarding proposed rule makings.
See Fisch, supra note 167, at 717. The SEC may therefore receive better information if it conducts its
survey prior to the notice period, or if the survey is conducted by a third party that is not required to
disclose the identity of the participants. Alternatively, views could be solicited as part of in-person
interviews.
209 Exec. Order No. 13,579, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,587 (July 11, 2011).
210 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Regulatory Lookback, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 579, 589–91 (2014).
211 See Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. §§ 315–316 (2017) (requiring a
regulatory impact analysis within five years of each new rule making regulation, and retrospective
review of regulations every five years).
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describes how the low cost and ease of evaluation of investor ordered regulations
facilitate effective regulatory experimentation.
A. The Reduced Need to Modify Investor Ordered Regulations
Retrospective analysis and modification of mandatory arrangements are
necessary because they are, by their nature, invariant. The regulator’s choice of
arrangements may have been sub-optimal at the time it was made, or may have
become so because of changes in circumstances. In extreme cases, mandatory
regulations could have negative net aggregate benefits. In a system of mandatory
rules, the only remedy is regulatory action to amend or repeal the regulation, which
requires retrospective analysis to identify, and new cost-benefit analysis to
implement.212 Mandatory rules therefore require continuous manual reevaluation
and readjustment.
Given the costs of cost-benefit analysis and regulatory change, this ongoing
retrospective evaluation and adjustment is costly, possibly even more so than for
initial regulations. Many parties will have made investment and other decisions
predicated on the existing regulation, and will therefore prefer to maintain the
status quo. Any readjustment by the regulator will require balancing the effects on
different parties, and managing their lobbying behavior regarding the regulation.
Given the SEC’s resource constraints, retrospective analysis and adjustment
cannot be carried out as frequently as would be necessary to adapt regulations to
continually changing circumstances, so mandatory regulations will always lag
behind what is optimal. Mandatory rules also lead to regulatory “cruft,”213 detritus
in the corpus of regulations, as outdated and sub-optimal regulations continue in
effect and accumulate over time.
In contrast, investor ordered rules are dynamic in their application. Investor
ordered regulations that have negative net aggregate benefits are substantially selfrepealing. If investors in a particular corporation believe a default arrangement to
be costly, either when it is implemented or as the corporation’s circumstances
change, then the corporation can switch to an alternative arrangement. Even if the
regulator eventually adjusts the default arrangement so it no longer applies to those
corporations, investor ordering would save the cost that would have been incurred
by those corporations during the lag until the regulation is adjusted. This obviates
the most pressing need for retrospective analysis of the rule at no additional cost to
the regulator: there is no longer an urgent need to identify and remedy costly
regulations because corporations and investors will themselves avoid most of the
costs of those regulations.

212

See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2012).
“Cruft” is computer jargon meaning “[e]xcess; superfluous junk; use esp. of redundant or
superseded code.” David Letzler, The Cruft of Fiction: Mega-Novels and the
Science of Paying Attention 5 (2017) (citing Eric S. Raymond, The New
Hacker’s Dictionary 135 (3d ed. 1996)).
213
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B. Automatic and Observable Assessment of Investor Ordered Regulations
The proportion of corporations that continue to be bound by an arrangement
(those that have not switched from the default arrangement), provides an
automatic, observable, timely, and incontrovertible metric for the value of the
regulation. In contrast, for mandatory regulations, the value of the regulation is not
apparent without retrospective analysis, which is costly, infrequent, and
contestable.
The observability of the proportion-bound metric has the effect of legitimizing
arrangements that continue to apply to large numbers of corporations and raising
doubts about the value of those arrangements that do not. Mandatory regulations
are routinely criticized for imposing costs on corporations. Evaluating the validity
of these criticisms often requires detailed analysis, if it is possible at all. Where
investor ordered arrangements continue to be widely in force, they are inoculated
against such criticism. Conversely, where a large number of corporations have
opted out of a default arrangement, that arrangement will be rapidly and rightfully
called into question, providing a signal to the regulator that the arrangement should
be reevaluated and revised.
Of course, the usefulness of the proportion-bound metric assumes
corporations correctly choose whether to switch arrangements. The metric does
not indicate whether investors benefit from the arrangement, but only whether
investors expect to benefit from the arrangement. However, since investors can
update their views on the appropriate arrangement and choose a new arrangement
if their previous choice proves incorrect, investor expectations are likely to
approach the actual effect of the regulation over time. As described in Part II.C.6,
this process will be accelerated by investors observing the switching decisions of
other corporations and the consequences of those decisions.
Investor ordering will not eliminate the usefulness of retrospective analysis
entirely. Some degree of retrospective analysis will continue to be warranted for
investor ordered rules because investors may not always choose optimal
arrangements, and because the extent to which they have or have not done so may
not be obvious. The non-zero cost of switching means that there is always a
possibility that some corporations for which an arrangement is costly will choose
not to switch because switching is costlier than the arrangement itself. Switching
may be under-initiated if investor ordered rules are not designed with optimal
default arrangements. Switching arrangements also takes time, and corporations
for which an arrangement is costly will continue to incur costs until they switch
arrangements. As a result, some degree of retrospective analysis and adjustment
will continue to be necessary for investor ordered regulation. However, investor
ordering will make such retrospective analysis less costly and more accurate than
retrospective analysis of mandatory regulations.
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C. Improved Retrospective Analysis Given Investor Ordering
Information produced by investor ordered regulations makes their
retrospective evaluation considerably easier and less costly than that of mandatory
regulations, which create no such information. As well as permitting the
observation of the aggregate proportion of corporations that prefer to switch
arrangements, investor ordered regulations create variation in arrangements, and
the differing outcomes for different arrangements provide insight into the effects
of the arrangements.
If some corporations have switched arrangements,214 the different
performance outcomes of those corporations and those with the default
arrangement can be observed. Where corporations switched arrangements
sometime after the rule came into effect, the different effects of the old
arrangement and the new arrangement on those corporations can also be
observed.215
The endogeneity of corporate switching decisions means that determining the
effects of arrangements will be difficult, but it may not be impossible. Decisions of
corporations to switch arrangements will be related to factors affecting those
particular corporations. It will be difficult to parse whether the difference in
outcomes for corporations that have switched arrangements is due to the
arrangement or to the underlying factors that caused the corporation to switch
arrangements (or not switch arrangements). However, there may be exogenous
differences in arrangements caused by factors unrelated to the nature of the
corporation that can be exploited to identify the effects of the arrangement.
The switching decisions of individual corporations also provide useful
information to regulators undertaking retrospective analysis.216 The reasons that
managers give for initiating switches will be publicly available, as will be the reasons
proxy advisors give for recommending for or against approval. These can be
evaluated by the SEC as part of its retrospective analysis. Where arrangements are
not binary, regulators can also observe which alternative arrangement switching
corporations chose to adopt.217 The prevalence of each type of arrangement, and
the determinants of the choice of arrangement, will be useful to the regulator in
evaluating alternatives to the regulation.
In contrast to investor ordering, retrospective analysis of mandatory rules is
difficult. Mandatory rules generate very little information. Under a mandatory rule
there is no cross-sectional variation in arrangements among corporations, and
almost no variation over time. The only variation produced by a mandatory rule
214 This would not apply if either no corporations or all corporations have opted out of the rule.
However, the latter possibility is theoretical at best, given the unlikelihood that the SEC would adopt
a rule that would have negative aggregate benefit for investors in all corporations.
215 This would not apply where corporations switched to alternative arrangements from the time
the regulation came into effect.
216 See Part II.C.6 for a discussion of the information content of switching.
217 The possibility of multiple alternative arrangements is discussed below. See infra Part V.A.7.
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that can be used for retrospective analysis is variation upon the rule’s
implementation.218 In the typical design of mandatory corporate regulations, all the
corporations that will be bound by the rule become bound by the rule at the same
time. This makes it very difficult to separate the effects of the regulation on
corporations from the effects of unrelated changes over time. As a result,
retrospective analysis is no easier than initial cost-benefit analysis: both involve
comparing the current state of the capital markets to a hypothetical counterfactual.
For prospective analysis, the counterfactual is the capital markets if the rule were
to be implemented. For retrospective analysis, the counterfactual is the capital
markets if the rule had not been implemented. Investor ordering, therefore, offers
significant benefits in facilitating retrospective analysis to the extent that analysis
remains necessary.
D. Lower-Cost Regulatory Experimentation
A number of scholars have suggested that regulators adopt experimental rules
to assess the effects of a potential regulation before it is implemented across the
board.219 Investor ordering reduces the need for experimentation. To the extent
that experimentation remains useful, investor ordered experiments would involve
lower costs and would overcome many of the difficulties with mandatory
experiments, albeit with some loss of fidelity for scholarship.
Proponents of regulatory experimentation have suggested that mandatory
rules be modified to produce variation in the application of the rules that would
make retrospective analysis more straightforward, and that small-scale
experiments should be conducted to determine whether larger-scale regulation is
warranted.220 The Financial CHOICE Act would require the SEC to consider such
regulatory experimentation.221 For corporations, an experimental rule could
mandate different arrangements for different corporations,222 or different
corporations could become subject to arrangements at different times.223
218 The possibility of regulation-mandated variation for experimental purposes is considered later.
See infra Part IV.D.
219 E.g., Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres & Yair Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev.
929 (2011); Zachary J. Gubler, Experimental Rules, 55 B.C. L. Rev. 129 (2014); Lee, supra note
97; Charles K. Whitehead, The Goldilocks Approach: Financial Risk and Staged Regulation Symposium:
Financial Regulatory Reform in the Wake of the Dodd-Frank Act, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 1267 (2012).
220 See, e.g., Cox & Baucom, supra note 167, at 1842; Whitehead, supra note 219, at 1298–99.
221 Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. § 312(a)(6) (2017) (requiring any SEC
regulation that did not involve a pilot program to explain why a pilot program is not appropriate).
222 For example, in 2005, the SEC relaxed Rule 10a-1 (the so-called “Uptick Rule”) with respect
to a proportion of Russell 3000 index constituent stocks. See Cox & Baucom, supra note 167, at 1843.
Since May 2016, the SEC has also been conducting a pilot study of increased quoting and trading
increments for small capitalization stocks. See Joint Industry Plans, Exchange Act Release No.
74,892, 111 SEC Docket 2239 (May 6, 2015).
223 Delayed implementation for smaller corporations has been used for a number of regulations.
E.g., Order Under Section 36 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Granting an Exemption From
Specified Provisions of Exchange Act Rules 13a-1 and 15d-1, Exchange Act Release No. 50,754, 84
SEC Docket 945 (Nov. 30, 2004) (delaying the implementation of reports on internal controls for
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The proportion-bound metric that investor ordering produces provides a clear
indicator for the effect of a regulation, reducing the need for experimental analysis
to determine the effect of a regulation. A variation on investor ordering also
provides a much less costly “pilot” process for new regulation. Rather than setting
restrictive defaults that maximize manager initiation, regulators could set minimal
defaults. While this would substantially reduce the likelihood of manager initiation,
and therefore of switching, it would also reduce the potential cost of the regulation.
However, if there is any switching—for instance, investor-initiated switching—
this would create information about the rule at very low cost. That information
could then be used to determine whether changing the rule to a more restrictive
default would be worthwhile.
The validity of inferences of regulatory value from switching decisions
depends on the critical assumption that investors make optimal switching
decisions. To the extent that this is not believed to be true, experimental analysis
may still be valuable. Experimental analysis may also inform investor decisions
about which arrangement to choose.
To the extent experimentation is considered worthwhile, it could be
implemented for investor ordering as well as for mandatory regulation by varying
default arrangements. This would have advantages and disadvantages compared to
experimentation with mandatory rules. On one hand, experimentation with
mandatory rules would have epistemic advantages over experimentation with
investor ordered rules, as corporations switching from the default would
reintroduce endogeneity concerns, making it more difficult to isolate the effect of
the arrangement.
On the other hand, experimental rules present significant problems for the
SEC, which would be ameliorated by investor ordering. Mandating arrangements
would only be useful if the SEC expected the arrangements to have some effect on
outcomes for corporations. Mandating an arrangement for some corporations
while prohibiting it for others would therefore advantage some corporations and
their investors over others. The most valuable variation from an epistemic point of
view would require treating similar corporations differently. However, by its very
nature, such treatment would be arbitrary and capricious, and therefore susceptible
to judicial invalidation.
Investor ordering would also have benefits in broadening the scope of potential
experimentation. If the SEC expected an arrangement to have negative aggregate
net benefits, mandating such an arrangement—even for experimental purposes—
would likely have negative effects on all corporations subject to the arrangement.
Undertaking such an experiment would be of limited value: if the SEC’s
expectations prove accurate, the SEC will not implement the rule. However,

small corporations); Internal Control Over Financial Reporting in Exchange Act Periodic Reports of
Non-Accelerated Filers, Securities Act Release No. 8934, Exchange Act Release No. 58,028, 93 SEC
Docket 1436 (July 2, 2008) (delaying internal control attestation for smaller corporations).
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aggregate negative net benefit rules can be value-enhancing if investor ordered, and
could be implemented at full-scale or on an experimental basis.
The choice of mandatory experimental rules over investor ordered
experimental rules therefore involves a tradeoff between limiting endogeneity—
and therefore producing clearer evidence of the effects of arrangements—against
mandating sub-optimal arrangements for particular corporations based on random
selection. Corporate law scholars—myself included—are predisposed to value the
clear understanding of the effects of arrangements. However, for regulators, and
for the corporations and investors affected by their regulations, such understanding
is merely a tool for determining the optimal arrangements for corporations. The
social value of such understanding is therefore less than the value of achieving its
ultimate objective, and having corporations choose optimal arrangements
themselves.
* * *
By offering the possibility of experimentation, automatic repeal of ineffective
regulations, greater feedback about the effects of rules, and lower-cost
experimentation, investor ordered rules could create a dynamic system for
corporate rules. In this respect, they would offer many of the benefits praised by
advocates of state competition,224 which—advocates claim—creates a dynamic
process that results in optimal arrangements for corporations.225 By incorporating
investor choice, investor ordered regulations would directly result in the
maximization of investor value.
V. Implementing Investor Ordering
The discussion above demonstrates that investor ordering will have
considerable benefits for most regulations, and may be required by law. This Part
considers the practical matter of how investor ordering should be implemented in
corporate regulation by the SEC, and offers concrete recommendations for which
new regulations and existing regulations may be appropriate initial candidates for
investor ordering. It then extends the implications of investor ordering to federal
legislation and state corporate law. The recommendations offered below should
not be thought of as complete, but rather as initial principles; they could evolve and

224 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law (1993);
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 52; Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the
Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. Legal Stud. 251 (1977).
225 There has been considerable debate about whether state competition creates rules that are
optimal for investors, or only for managers. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the
Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1435
(1992); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663
(1974). In contrast to state competition, investor ordering by the SEC would permit the benefits of
greater dynamism while maintaining a central regulator to ensure that the process does not go awry.
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improve iteratively as the SEC implements investor ordered regulations and
observes their consequences.
A. Implementing Investor Ordering in Corporate Regulations
1. Investor Ordering as the Default for SEC Regulation
The discussion above makes clear that investor ordering of corporate
regulations will be superior to mandatory rules, other than where there are
significant potential externalities that are not internalized by institutional
investors. Investor ordering should therefore be the SEC’s default approach for
new corporate regulations where there is a body of equity investors that can
undertake investor ordering.226 The SEC’s rule making process should focus on
determining whether there is a significant likelihood of externalities that
institutional investors will not internalize or other factors that would outweigh the
benefits of investor ordering. Only if that determination is satisfied should a rule
be mandatory.
This approach provides a straightforward framework for judicial review of SEC
rule making to determine whether the SEC’s choice between mandatory rules or
investor ordered rules was arbitrary and capricious. Such a framework would
reduce the cost of judicial review of SEC rule making, both to the courts and for
the SEC, and allow the SEC greater certainty regarding whether regulations would
survive judicial review.
2. Designing Switching Requirements
The SEC’s design of investor ordered regulations should incorporate the
principles set out in Part II.A: either managers or investors could initiate switching,
and switching should require the approval of a majority of votes cast by outside
investors.
These principles mean that switching should not be conditioned on state law
mechanisms, such as a change to the charter or the bylaws of a corporation. Those
mechanisms have their own process rules established by state law, which cannot be
easily adapted to these optimal specifications. For instance, charter amendments
cannot be initiated by shareholders, and have majority requirements of all
outstanding shares, rather than votes cast, or of outside shareholders. Bylaws can
generally be amended by directors without investor approval.227 In addition,
explicit references to state law may sit uncomfortably in federal regulations.
226

The choice of the default approach to regulation can be understood as a meta-discussion,
suggesting the altering rules for altering rules. Cf. Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory
of Altering Rules, 121 Yale L.J. 2032, 2074–75 (2012).
227 See generally Fisch, supra note 49. Directors can even amend bylaw provisions that have been
included by a shareholder vote, as was the case in October 2014 when Bank of America directors
removed a provision from the corporation’s bylaws separating the roles of Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of the corporation. See Christina Rexrode & Dan Fitzpatrick, Investors Chide Bank
of America on Combining Chairman-CEO Roles, Wall St. J., (Oct. 30, 2014),
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The SEC should therefore design its own bespoke switching arrangements,
which could be incorporated into particular regulations. For example, a bespoke
switching provision could be drafted as follows:
Unless a resolution expressly electing not to be bound by
this Rule has been approved by shareholders
representing (a) a majority of the voting power of a
registrant voting at the annual meeting of the registrant,
and (b) a majority of such voting power excluding
securities held by any director, officer, or person who is
directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than
10 percent of any class of any equity security of the
registrant, . . . .228
Most parsimoniously, the SEC could draft a standing rule that permitted
switching, which could be incorporated by reference into corporate regulations.
Such a rule would be well placed among other existing SEC proxy regulations that
affect shareholder meetings.229
Bylaws and charters create a register of the choices of arrangements that
corporations have made. Since the bespoke switching arrangement would not make
use of bylaws or charters, it would require another method for maintaining such a
register of the default arrangements a corporation had switched out of. Such a
register could appropriately be located among the required corporate governance
disclosure in the corporation’s annual report on Form 10-K.230
The SEC could clarify by way of staff guidance what kind of resolution would
be considered necessary for switching. Ideally, individual resolutions of
corporations would not require particular language, and any resolution that is
clearly intended to opt out of or opt into a regulation would be considered effective.
While the question of whether particular resolutions satisfied this test would be
justiciable, adjudication is unlikely to be necessary, as investors would not approve
provisions that did not unambiguously opt out of the rule.231
http://www.wsj.com/articles/some-investors-chafe-at-bank-of-america-combining-chairman-ceoroles-1414698418.
228 This language assumes the SEC implements manager restricting defaults. If the SEC did decide
that less-manager-restricting (i.e., opt-in) rules were appropriate in particular circumstances, similar
language would apply mutatis mutandis, with the first part of the provision replaced by “If a resolution
expressly electing to be bound by this Rule has been approved . . . .”
229 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012).
230 See 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (2017).
231 By way of comparison, the charter language of Delaware corporations opting out of § 102(b)(7)
has generally either tracked the statutory language or broadly eliminated liability (e.g., “to the fullest
extent permissible by law”). See Blake Rohrbacher, § 4.13 Limitation of Liability, in R. Franklin
Balotti & Jesse A. Finkelstein, The Delaware Law of Corporations &
Business Organizations (3d ed. 2017). Despite the extensiveness of his discussion of §
102(b)(7), Rohrbacher does not cite any cases where a Delaware court required particular wording
for amendments purporting to opt out of § 102(b)(7).
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These arrangements would also permit shareholders to initiate switching
decisions by putting forward shareholder proposals for inclusion in the company
proxy pursuant to Rule 14a-8.232
If switching decisions could be bundled into a single proposal with other
arrangements, managers might abuse such bundling to influence investor voting on
arrangements. For instance, consider a resolution that is favored by managers but
which investors do not believe to be in their best interest. Managers could
“bundle” the resolution with a “sweetener”—make it contingent on some benefit
to investors. A sufficient sweetener might lead investors to support the bundle,
even though they did not believe the resolution itself to be in their best interest.233
The SEC has previously dealt with this concern by adopting anti-bundling rules
into Rule 14a-4, which would also apply to proposals for switching arrangements. 234
As illustrated in the example provision above, the rule could make use of
existing regulatory concepts to cover insiders who are current managers or
directors, and others who can influence control over the corporation.235
If the SEC wished, it could also permit investors to opt out of the requirement
that investors approve switching. That is, if investors believed that the cost of
approving switching exceeded the expected cost of value-decreasing switching that
managers might prefer, investors could permit managers to make switching
decisions without investor approval. This would effectively change investor
ordering to manager ordering. Investors could also put in place alternative
switching requirements that they believe to be optimal.
3. Switching Back
Investors should also have the possibility of switching back to the default
arrangement—or switching to another arrangement—in the event that their initial
switching decisions prove to be sub-optimal, or where circumstances change to
make the substituted arrangement no longer optimal. Switching decisions should,

232

Under these arrangements, Rule 14a-8 proposals would not face the difficulties involved in
submitting bylaw amendments through the Rule 14a-8 process. See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 79,
at 341.
233 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Ehud Kamar, Bundling and Entrenchment, 123 Harv. L. Rev.
1549, 1552 (2010) (discussing bundling of arrangements generally); Gordon, supra note 51, at 1577
(discussing “sweeteners”).
234 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(a)(3) (requiring the form of proxy to “identify . . . each separate
matter to be acted upon”); id. § 240.14a-4(b)(1) (requiring means to approve, disapprove or abstain
with respect to “each separate matter”); see also Greenlight Capital, L.P. v. Apple, Inc., No. 13 CIV.
900 RJS, 2013 WL 646547 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2013) (interpreting these provisions with respect to
bundled charter amendments); Julian Ellis, The “Common Practice” of Bundling: Fact or Fiction?, 91
Denv. U. L. Rev. Online 105 (2014) (discussing the anti-bundling rule and its interpretation).
235 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2012), implemented in 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.16a1–240.16a-13 (requiring disclosure of changes of beneficial ownership by directors, officers, and
principal stockholders).

53

therefore, be reversible by the same process as applied to the initial switching.236
This could be achieved by adding the following clause to the language proposed in
the previous section:
and such shareholders have not subsequently approved
a resolution expressly reversing such prior resolution,
...
Given that initial defaults will generally be manager-restricting, switching back
to those arrangements would likely be initiated by managers less often than would
be optimal. Under-initiation of switching back could be overcome by incorporating
a sunset provision into initial switching decisions.237 Initial switching decisions
would lapse after a period of time—five years, for instance— and the corporation
would once again be bound by the default arrangement, unless investors once again
opted out of the rule.238 This could be achieved by revising the language above from
“have not subsequently approved a resolution” to “have not, within the last five
years, approved a resolution.” Where repeated sunset periods have passed, and
corporations that switched arrangements have not decided to switch back, sunset
provisions may impose net costs. The SEC could observe such a circumstance in
its retrospective analysis of the rule, and could thereafter relax or remove the
sunset requirement.
4. Approval of Pre-IPO Switching
Before corporations become public they are controlled by insiders, including
founders, managers, and undiversified blockholders, such as venture capital funds
and private equity funds.239 If the value effects of corporate arrangements are
accurately incorporated into the IPO price, insiders will have incentives to make
optimal switching decisions. However, if this is not the case, insiders may not
choose the arrangements that public investors would consider optimal.240 There is
therefore an argument that investor ordering should require arrangements to be
approved by investors after the corporation becomes public, when the corporation
has developed a mature public shareholder base that includes institutional
236 Cf. Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 79, at 357 (proposing that shareholders have the ability to
reverse earlier opt-out decisions regarding proxy access).
237 See id. at 357 n.113 (proposing a sunset as an alternative for ensuring that shareholders continue
to support opt-outs).
238 This is comparable to the SEC’s say-on-frequency rule, whereby every six years, investors
must elect whether to require a say-on-pay vote on executive compensation at one-, two-, or threeyear intervals. See Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n–1(a)(2).
239 If such investors have a sufficiently large stake to influence control over the corporation they
may also be considered insiders under the definition in Part I.B.
240 Whether or not these investors have an incentive to choose optimal arrangements depends on
whether the IPO market accurately incorporates the value of those arrangements into the IPO price.
This has long been a source of considerable debate. Cf. Barzuza, supra note 23; Klausner, supra note
23 (discussing evidence that corporate arrangements chosen before IPOs do not reflect the
preferences of public investors).
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investors.241 Whether or not insiders would choose the optimal arrangements,
outside investors will choose arrangements that are optimal for ongoing investors
in the corporation, and will internalize more of the effects of the arrangements on
the capital markets. However, if insiders cannot irrevocably choose the
arrangements that they prefer, they may avoid going public. This is a debate that
that has been active for at least thirty years.242 My proposal does not take a position
on either side of this debate. Rather, the SEC should determine whether pre-IPO
switching decisions with respect to particular arrangements should require postIPO approval. In reality, because of the very small number of IPOs each year, the
significance of pre-IPO switching is likely to be limited.243
5. Choosing Default Rules
As described in Part II.A.4, the optimality of investor ordering depends on the
SEC choosing default rules that are most likely to cause managers to initiate
switching. The optimal default will generally be the plausible arrangement most
restrictive of, or least privately beneficial to, managers. It will often be clear from
the SEC’s economic analysis which plausible rule is most restrictive of managers
or otherwise most likely to cause managers to initiate switching. This could be
confirmed by considering the desires expressed with respect to particular
arrangements by representatives of management during the notice-and-comment
period.244
In limited circumstances the SEC may determine that another default may be
preferable because it would be more likely to lead to the optimal set of corporations
being bound by the arrangement. Negative aggregate net benefit rules and
experimental rules may be better designed with the status quo arrangement as the
default, even though this may be less likely to result in initiation of switching.
However, the lower the costs of switching, the less frequent should be exceptions
to the default of manager-initiation-maximizing defaults.
6. Reducing Switching Costs and Decision Costs
SEC regulations should be designed to reduce switching costs as much as
possible. The lower the cost of switching arrangements, the greater the aggregate
net benefit that will result from investor ordering. Switching by voting at annual
241 For a similar proposal with respect to dual-class share arrangements, see Lucian A. Bebchuk &
Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock, 103 Va. L. Rev. 585 (2017).
242 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Freedom of Contract and the Corporation: An Essay on the Mandatory
Role of Corporate Law (Harvard Law Sch. Program in Law and Econ., Discussion Paper No. 46, 1988).
243 See, e.g., Gao, Ritter & Zhu, supra note 90, at 1663 (observing an average of “99 IPOs per year
during 2001-2012”). The small number of IPOs compares to more than at least 3,500 public
corporations every year in that period. See Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, supra note 90, at 473 tbl.3.
244 This would include letters submitted by managers of individual corporations, as well as letters
submitted by trade groups that represent managers and corporations, like the Business Roundtable,
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and corporate law firms that generally represent corporations. See,
e.g., supra note 207.
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meetings is likely to require little marginal direct cost; adding an additional
proposal to the agenda of an annual meeting will not add significantly to the costs
of the meeting or to the costs of voting.
The main additional costs from investor ordering are likely to be the decision
costs of managers and investors informing themselves about optimal
arrangements. As discussed in Part II.C.6, to the extent that many different
investors and corporations are generating this information themselves, this will be
duplicative. The SEC can reduce information costs by undertaking the
generalizable part of this analysis themselves in their economic analysis of the
regulation, which becomes publicly available. The SEC can suggest the factors
likely to determine the differing costs and benefits for different corporations.245 All
that would remain would be for managers and investors to determine the extent to
which these costs and benefits applied to their corporations.
Proxy advisors further assist investors in reducing decision costs. By producing
information that is useful to investors, and sharing the cost of that information
among many investors, they prevent the costly duplication of information
production by investors. The value of proxy advisors for investor ordering militates
against restrictions on proxy advisors of the kind contained in the Financial
CHOICE Act bill,246 which would make their production of information more
difficult or more costly.
7. Multiple Alternative Arrangements
So far investor ordering has been discussed as a binary choice between having
an arrangement and not having the arrangement. In practice investors may prefer
to have some but not all of the effects of the arrangement. Managers or investors
who initiate switching are likely to propose alternative arrangements with such
effects in order to induce investors to vote to switch arrangements.247 Corporations
can maintain some network externality benefits by fixing upon one of a small
“menu” of arrangements.248 The SEC can facilitate such a process by proposing a
menu of alternative arrangements in its rule making. The SEC’s economic analysis
is required to consider alternatives,249 and such a requirement may be further

245 See Clark, supra note 53, at 1718 (suggesting that the SEC may have superior understanding of
matters of general application to corporations).
246 Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. § 482 (2017) (creating onerous
requirements for registration of proxy advisory firms and conditions for their activities).
247 Such bundling of arrangements might create distortions by permitting managers to add
sweeteners. See Bebchuk & Kamar, supra note 233; Gordon, supra note 51, at 1577–78.
248 Cf. Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 3 (2006); Yair Listokin, What Do Corporate
Default Rules and Menus Do? An Empirical Examination, 6 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 279
(2009).
249 See SEC, supra note 196, at 8 (stating that SEC releases should “identify and discuss
reasonable potential alternatives to the approach in the proposed rule”).
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enshrined in law by the Financial CHOICE Act.250 By fully articulating alternative
arrangements, the SEC can provide focal point arrangements that corporations
could fix upon, thereby increasing the value of network externalities from the
rule.251
B. Potential Investor Ordered Regulation and Deregulation
1. Potential New Investor Ordered Regulations
This Article has focused on the proposition that investor ordering is superior
to mandatory rules. However, the process of regulation and deregulation requires
the SEC to answer a different question: would a new rule of either variety be
superior to the existing rule? This section combines the two questions and
considers potential subjects for new investor ordered regulations.
In considering initial subjects for investor ordering, the SEC should initially
look for fire where there is smoke. That is, the SEC should consider topics whose
costs and benefits have been the source of contention. There are a number of
potential subjects for regulation that have been the subject of such contentious
debate, particularly regarding the cost of potential regulation. Many of these
potential regulations have strong support from investors, but there is uncertainty
regarding the potential costs the regulation would create for corporations and their
investors. Other arrangements have limited support from investors but strong
support from other constituencies. Both categories would appear to be particularly
good candidates for investor ordered regulation, which would let investors
themselves determine whether the benefit of the regulation outweighed the costs.
Promising examples among proposed or potential rules include proxy access,252
universal proxies,253 claw-backs, and disclosure of political spending by
corporations.254
2. Potential Investor Ordered Deregulation
The benefits of investor ordering also apply to SEC rule changes to deregulate
existing mandatory rules. Moving from mandatory regulations to investor ordered
regulations will result in no additional costs to corporations affected by the
250 See H.R. 10 § 312(a)(6) (requiring “an identification and assessment of all available alternatives
to the regulation”).
251 A similar point is made by Chief Justice Strine of the Delaware Supreme Court, and Vice
Chancellor Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery in arguing for a standard set of fiduciary
defaults for alternative entities. See Leo E. Jr. Strine & J. Travis Laster, The Siren Song of Unlimited
Contractual Freedom, in Robert W. Hillman & Mark J. Loewenstein, Research
Handbook on Partnerships, LLCs & Alternative Forms of Business
Organizations 11, 13 (2015).
252 Authors have called for investor ordered rules on proxy access. See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra
note 79, at 356–58; McDonnell, supra note 79, at 71.
253 See Scott Hirst, Universal Proxies, 35 Yale J. Reg. (forthcoming 2018) (calling for investor
ordering of universal proxies).
254 Cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending,
101 Geo. L.J. 923, 947 (2013) (arguing for mandatory SEC regulation of corporate political spending
disclosure).
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regulations. Such moves will also have aggregate net benefits, if there are no
potential externalities that would not be internalized by institutional investors. Of
course, deregulation will also involve direct costs for the SEC, including the cost
of cost-benefit analysis. The SEC must therefore determine whether the aggregate
net benefit from moving from a mandatory rule to investor ordering will be greater
than the direct cost of deregulation. This will depend on the extent to which
investors will switch from the default arrangement and their net benefits from
switching.
The extent of switching by corporations may be lower for investor ordered
deregulation than for new investor ordered regulations, since switching costs will
be higher. Given that a mandatory rule may have been in place for some time,
corporations and investors are likely to have invested in systems predicated on the
mandated arrangement. Replacing these with new systems will increase switching
costs.
For the large body of SEC rules about which investors and managers have not
expressed dissatisfaction—where there is no smoke—there is likely to be limited
benefit to switching. Such limited benefit may be too small to overcome these
switching costs and may not merit the direct costs of SEC deregulation. Rules that
fall into this category are likely to include the requirement that corporations
disclose annual, quarterly, and periodic reports;255 and prohibitions on fraud,
misleading and deceptive conduct,256 and insider trading.257
However, a number of existing mandatory rules have attracted considerable
criticism. Especially for the more recent of these rules, there may be sufficient
cause to consider deregulation by investor ordering. Such rules include conflict
minerals,258 pay ratios,259 disclosure of internal control requirements,260 and sayon-pay.261 Some long-standing regulations have also recently been attacked as
255 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2012); id. § 78o(d); 17 C.F.R. §§
240.13a-1– 240.13a-20, 240.15d-1–240.15d-20 (2017).
256 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017).
257 See id. §§ 240.10b5-1–240.10b5-2 (2017). There has been considerable discussion of the
possibility of opting out of insider trading rules. E.g., Ian Ayres & Stephen Choi, Internalizing Outsider
Trading, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 313, 324 (2002); Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The
Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 857, 866 (1983); David D. Haddock & Jonathan R.
Macey, Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1449, 1451 (1986).
258 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13p-1 (2017). The rule is currently under reconsideration by the SEC. See
Press Release, Michael S. Piwowar, Acting Chairman, SEC, Reconsideration of Conflict Minerals
Rule Implementation (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/reconsideration-ofconflict-minerals-rule-implementation.html.
259 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402u (2017). The rule is currently under reconsideration by the SEC. See
Press Release, Michael S. Piwowar, Acting Chairman, SEC, Reconsideration of Pay Ratio Rule
Implementation (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/reconsideration-of-payratio-rule-implementation.html.
260 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15 (2017).
261 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n–1 (2012). Notwithstanding recent criticism,
for example Leo E. Strine, Securing Our Nation’s Economic Future: A Sensible, Nonpartisan Agenda to
Increase Long-Term Investment and Job Creation in the United States, Soc. Sci. Res. Network, (2015)
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costly for corporations,262 and could also be considered for deregulation through
investor ordering. These include requirement for disclosure of beneficial
interests263 and requirements to include shareholder proposals in proxy
statements.264
The SEC may also face external pressure—or a congressional requirement—
to deregulate particular rules. Given such pressure or requirement, the above
analysis makes clear that moving to investor ordered rules would have greater
aggregate net benefit than moving to manager ordered rules. If the SEC chooses to
deregulate a particular rule, or if Congress requires it to do so, then the same D.C.
Circuit jurisprudence discussed in Part III.A is likely to require the SEC to consider
investor ordering as an alternative. If the proposed deregulation is expected to
result in less aggregate net benefit than an investor ordered alternative, it is likely
to be considered arbitrary and capricious, and could therefore be invalidated.
C. Investor Ordering and Federal Legislation
A further implication of the greater aggregate net benefit of investor ordering
regards the SEC’s leeway to promulgate regulations. For many corporate
regulations, legislative provisions leave little discretion for the SEC to design
optimal rules. Legislation either incorporates rules directly265 or requires the SEC
to implement rules with certain effects.266 Recent appropriations bills and the
Financial CHOICE Act267 go further in prohibiting the SEC from taking certain
actions. Because Congress does not undertake any formal cost-benefit analysis
regarding these requirements, they are likely to be less well considered than rules
designed by the SEC with its comprehensive cost-benefit analysis.268
There would also appear to be some hypocrisy in a congressional requirement
for the SEC to undertake greater cost-benefit analysis. Congress does not itself
(calling for triennial or quadrennial say-on-pay votes), there appears to be broad investor support for
annual say-on-pay votes, for example John Roe, U.S. Proxy Season Half-Time Update, Harv. L.
Sch. F. on Corp. Governance
& Fin. Reg. (May 31, 2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/31/u-s-proxy-season-half-time-update/ (showing 92% of
votes through May 26, 2017 favored annual elections).
262 See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable, supra note 45, at 6 (calling for revision of shareholder proposal
rules); Emmerich, Mirvis, Robinson & Savitt, supra note 45, at 140 (calling for revision of blockholder
disclosure).
263 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1–240.13d-2 (2017); see also Mitts, supra note 79, at 244 (arguing for
private ordering of blockholder disclosure by shareholder bylaw amendments).
264 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2017).
265 See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n–1 (requiring advisory votes on executive
compensation).
266 See, e.g., id. § 78n–2 (requiring the SEC to issue rules requiring corporations to disclose why
they have the same person or different persons acting as chairman and chief executive officer).
267 See, e.g., Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. § 845 (2017) (prohibiting the
SEC from requiring corporations and other proponents to use a single proxy card).
268 There is some irony in the Financial CHOICE Act requiring considerably greater cost-benefit
analysis by the SEC, while failing to undertake any cost-benefit analysis on its own extensive
requirements, including the requirement for cost-benefit analysis.
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undertake any formal cost-benefit analysis, including any cost-benefit analysis of
requiring SEC cost-benefit analysis. By requiring the SEC to implement certain
regulations, Congress also reduces the permissible scope of the very cost-benefit
analysis that congressional legislation requires of the SEC.269
These considerations mean that congressional mandates reduce the likelihood
that the SEC can implement value-enhancing rules. In order to maximize investor
value and social welfare, Congress should permit the SEC greater discretion to
implement regulations and should not require or prohibit particular arrangements
or regulatory designs.
D. Investor Ordering and State Corporate Law
While the focus of this Article is corporate regulations, the analysis of investor
ordering also suggests a number of conclusions for state corporate law.270 First,
state corporate law rules—whether established by legislatures or courts—generally
do not involve any formal cost-benefit analysis. This suggests that their design may
not incorporate optimal switching rules or default arrangements. Second, while the
majority of state law rules are privately ordered, a number are mandatory.271 As the
framework presented in this Article makes clear, these could be sub-optimal
compared to investor ordered rules. Third, even though the majority of state
corporate law rules are privately ordered, they do not fit the optimal switching
arrangements for investor ordering set out above.272 A number of state corporate
laws can be varied in the bylaws of a corporation, which can often be amended by
directors without shareholder action.273 However, in most cases charter
amendments are required to switch from default corporate law rules. While these
require investor approval, they can only be initiated by the directors of the
corporation.274 Moreover, in controlled corporations there is no requirement that
switches be approved by outside investors. In addition, where switching decisions
are approved by investors, voting requirements for approval are generally some
proportion of shares outstanding,275 making it more likely that retail voters would
be pivotal in votes to approve switching decisions made once a corporation is
public. Finally, state law defaults are often less restrictive of managers than the
plausible alternatives, making it less likely that managers will initiate switching to
such alternative arrangements.276
269 See, e.g., Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,350 (Sept. 12, 2012) (providing limited
analysis of the benefits of the SEC’s Conflict Minerals rule because it had been required by Congress).
270 See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 24 (discussing the desirable design of investor ordering in
state corporate law).
271 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 51, at 1553 (listing the “striking number of mandatory norms” in
Delaware corporate law).
272 See supra Part II.A.2.
273 See Fisch, supra note 49.
274 E.g., General Corporation Law, Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (2017).
275 See Hirst, supra note 86, at 99–100.
276 See Barzuza, supra note 23; Klausner, supra note 23; see also discussion supra Part II.C.1.
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For these reasons, state law rules are likely to be sub-optimal and could be
improved by implementing investor ordering. This would require amending a
number of state law rules, such as: requiring that switching decisions be made in
the charter rather than the bylaws of the corporation or restricting manager
amendment of certain bylaw arrangements;277 permitting investor initiation of
charter amendments;278 and amending defaults to be manager-restricting.
Conclusion
The rise of institutional investors provides an answer to the foundational
debate about whether corporate arrangements should be mandatory or enabling:
they should be investor ordered. For the great majority of regulations at the great
majority of corporations, investor ordering will result in the same or greater
aggregate net benefit to investors. SEC regulations regarding corporate
arrangements have heretofore invariably been mandatory. Future SEC corporate
regulations should be investor ordered by default. In many cases, future corporate
regulations will be required to be investor ordered; were the SEC to implement a
mandatory regulation when investor ordering would offer greater aggregate net
benefits, the regulation would be subject to invalidation as “arbitrary and
capricious.” Implementing investor ordering will not only bring about greater
aggregate net benefits for investors, and therefore greater social welfare, but will
also reduce the cost of rule making for the SEC and lead to a more dynamic
regulatory system.
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See Fisch, supra note 49, at 36 (advocating greater judicial oversight of board-adopted bylaws).
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 833,
865 (2005).
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